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Introduction 
 
Eight years have elapsed since the publication of Roy Bhaskar’s Dialectic. The 
stated aim of this project was extraordinarily ambitious. This was basically 
threefold. First, the ‘dialectical enrichment and deepening of critical realism – 
understood as consisting of transcendental realism as a general theory of science 
and critical naturalism as a special theory of social science’. Second, ‘the 
development of a general theory of dialectic … which will … be capable of 
sustaining the development of a general metatheory for the social sciences, on the 
basis of which they will be capable of functioning as agencies of human self-
emancipation.’ Third, ‘the outline of the elements of a totalising critique of 
western philosophy, in its various (including hitherto dialectical) forms … [that is] 
capable … of casting light on the contemporary crisis of socialism’.1 All of this 
was to be achieved primarily through the ‘non-preservative sublation of Hegelian 
dialectic’2 and the preservative sublation of Marxian dialectic. Bhaskar’s Dialectic 
thus offered the prospect of providing ‘a philosophical basis for Marxian social 
theory consistent with Marx’s own undeveloped methodological insights’3 and of 
philosophically under-labouring a genuinely emancipatory socialist political 
project. 
Given the scope of the ambition of Dialectic (in terms of politics and 
philosophy), and given that it was intended to clarify Bhaskar’s relationship to 
Marxism, drawing up a balance sheet of the respective merits and demerits of the 
new dialectical critical realism (DCR) system introduced by Bhaskar in Dialectic 
is long overdue. This is the task of the current undertaking. This will entail 
addressing two kinds of issues. First, the issue of whether the DCR system of 
Dialectic overreaches and transcends Bhaskar’s earlier critical realism (CR) 
system, and the adequacy of Bhaskar’s dialectical concepts. Second, the issue of 
the nature of the relationship between Marxism and Bhaskar’s dialectic. Here I 
will consider the following questions. Does Bhaskar’s DCR amount to a 
‘transcendence’ or ‘outflanking’ (albeit sublative) of Marxian dialectic? Is DCR 
indispensable to Marxism for the formal specification of its dialectics? Or is 
Bhaskar’s dialectic better understood as simply the systematic specification, 
refinement and development of Marxian dialectic, a legitimate extension and 
deepening of Marxian dialectic?  
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 The broad argument pursued here can be summarised as follows. First, 
although Bhaskar’s DCR system is a qualitative advance on his earlier CR system, 
and although it undoubtedly offers important insights for Marxism, it neither 
outflanks nor transcends Marxian dialectic, but is rather dependent on it, and often 
in unacknowledged ways. Second, despite the considerable merits of Bhaskar’s 
dialectic, its explanatory and critical edge is considerably blunted by a range of 
conceptual ambiguities, problems and defects, at least some of which are not 
shared by classical Marxian dialectic.  
It is these which problematise any interpretation of Bhaskar’s DCR as a 
‘new beginning’ for Marxism. Yet this is not to say that the broader Bhaskarian 
project of specifying a defensible realist philosophy is not of fundamental 
relevance to Marxism. Bhaskar’s central concepts of stratification and emergence, 
which undergo further development in his DCR system, do allow of a productive 
solution to some major dilemmas of Marxist thought (such as the relationship 
between freedom and necessity, voluntarism and determinism, agency and 
structure, and base and superstructure), though these concepts were initially 
developed outside the DCR system.  
Third, notwithstanding the limitations of Dialectic, Bhaskar’s DCR is a 
welcome and progressive development of his CR, not least because he 
rehabilitates dialectical analysis in philosophy and social theory, and to an 
audience often unfamiliar with and sometimes hostile to dialectics, in a fashion 
which is broadly consistent with Marxian dialectic. Therefore, a synthesis of these 
fundamental ontological concepts of CR and DCR with Marxian dialectic offers 
the prospect of a promising way forward for critical emancipatory theory. For 
some this is what Bhaskar’s Dialectic is all about. Yet I will argue that Bhaskar 
has not adequately fulfilled this task.  
Before dealing with these issues and developing these sorts of arguments, 
however, it is necessary to briefly consider the substance of Bhaskar’s critique of 
Hegelian dialectic. For Bhaskar’s non-preservative sublation of Hegel’s 
philosophy (as he sees it) is precisely the foundation of his own reconstructed 
dialectic. 
 
 
Bhaskar’s critique of Hegelian dialectic  
 
For Bhaskar, the principal difficulty of Hegel’s logic is its eradication of the 
dualism of thought and reality, of subject and object, by means of ‘a complete and 
self-consistent idealism’, which vindicates ‘the identity of being and thought in 
thought’.4 Hegel, says Bhaskar, conceives of dialectic as a ‘logical process … of 
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 reunification of opposites, transcendence of limitations and reconciliation of 
differences’:5 
 
From the achieved vantage point of (positive) reason the mutual exclusivity 
of opposites passes over into the recognition of their reciprocal 
interdependence (mutual inclusion): they remain inseparable yet distinct 
moments in a richer, more total conceptual formation (which will in turn 
generate a new contradiction of its own). It is the constellational identity of 
understanding and reason within reason which fashions the continually 
recursively expanding kaleidoscopic tableaux of absolute idealism… 
Dialectic … is … the process by which the various categories, notions or 
forms of consciousness arise out of each other to inform ever more inclusive 
totalities until the system of categories, notions or forms as a whole is 
completed.
6
 
 
         Enlightenment is thus a process of negating negation, and it culminates in 
the ‘achieved constellational identity’ of subject and object in consciousness, as 
thought finally grasps the world as rational totality, as part of itself, which exists 
as rational totality in order to enable philosophical self-consciousness to be 
achieved. The unification of subject and object is, then, simply the process by 
which Reason becomes self-conscious. This constitutes the telos of Hegel’s 
system, the historical moment where totality becomes ‘constellationally’ closed or 
completed.
7
  
 
For Hegel … truth is the whole, the whole is a process and this process is 
reason… Its result is reconciliation to life in (Hegelian) freedom. Error lies 
is one-sidedness, incompleteness and abstraction. Its symptom is the 
contradictions it generates and its remedy their incorporation into fuller, 
richer, more concrete, inclusive, englobing and highly mediated conceptual 
forms.
8
 
 
Now the chief problem with Hegel’s method, argues Bhaskar, is that it rides 
roughshod over the ontological reality of stratification and emergence, which the 
‘first wave’ of his critical realist philosophy was concerned with demonstrating. In 
effect, Hegel’s dialectic parcels itself out by resorting to ‘cognitive triumphalism’. 
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 ‘Cognitive triumphalism’, says Bhaskar, involves postulating the identity of being 
and consciousness, thought and existence. But this identity is possible only given 
Hegel’s ‘anthropomorphic’ conception of knowledge (ie. his assumption that the 
totality of strata are in principle fully knowable), and his imposition of an artificial 
closure on totality (to allow the possibility of a correspondence of knowledge and 
reality once the former has ‘caught up’ with the latter). Bhaskar wishes to show 
that the realist concepts of stratification and emergence cannot support Hegel’s 
notion of a closed totality, this undermining his identity of subjective and objective 
dialectics. For Bhaskar, by contrast, ‘[g]ood totalities are … open; bad totalities 
are … closed … the exact opposite of Hegel’s point of view’.9 
But, says Bhaskar, ‘the non-identity of subject and object ensures that there 
is no reason why all being must be conceivable being, let alone why all being must 
be conceived of already.’ The fact that the cosmos is an ‘“open totality” ensures 
that there is always the possibility, indeed likelihood, of newly emergent strata 
(most importantly, the possibility of new social structures brought about by human 
agency), so that reality is forever incomplete and inherently impossible to grasp 
fully’.10 Bhaskar’s critique (whatever the merits of his interpretation of Hegel) 
thus lends support and real theoretical content to the key term of materialist 
dialectic: the unity-in-difference of being and consciousness  
As Andrew Brown points out, for Bhaskar, because strata are ‘equal 
members of the same hierarchy, [they have] an aspect of unity (dualism or 
pluralism is rejected)’; at the same time, because ‘the strata are not the same as, 
nor reducible to, one another … they have an aspect of difference (reductionism is 
rejected)’.11 By contrast, cognitive triumphalism, argues Bhaskar, involves 
reducing the world to a non-hierarchical flat space with fixed or determinate 
boundaries and dimensions, calling to a halt the ongoing process of determinate 
negation in physical and social systems. This denies the existence of ‘multiple 
totalities’ and of the openness and incompleteness of each of these, and can lead to 
the ‘epistemic fallacy’ of treating questions about knowledge and questions about 
the world as identical, thereby reducing ontology to epistemology. 
Yet Hegel’s cognitive triumphalism is logically internally questionable as 
well as insecure on substantive theoretical grounds, says Bhaskar. For Hegel, 
‘truth consists in totality and the conformity of an object to its notion.’ This being 
the case, Hegel ought to accept that ‘the concept of an open totality must be more 
true (complete and adequate) than the concept of a closed totality, because it is 
more comprehensive, englobing and contains the latter as a special case’.12 But 
Hegel’s view is exactly the opposite, claims Bhaskar. Thus Bhaskar’s attribution 
to Hegel of a ‘principle of identity’, interpreted as the view that there must be no 
discrepancy between thought and its objects, stands in contradiction to the rational 
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 unfolding of Hegel’s conceptual dialectic. Logically, the structures of reality have 
to be grasped as ‘open-ended’, if Hegel’s ‘progressivist’ conceptualisation of 
dialectic as the movement towards a richer, fuller, more universal philosophical 
consciousness is to be upheld. 
 
 
Bhaskar’s dialectic 
 
Bhaskar’s dialectic has a number of fundamental features that are especially 
worthy of note. First, Bhaskar rejects the ‘traditional’ (Hegelian?) understanding 
of dialectic as the linear triadic process of negation (thesis-antithesis-synthesis), 
though he does not explicitly identify this understanding with Hegel here. Bhaskar 
wishes to break with the view that dialectic is simply about the ‘law’ of the 
interpenetration of opposites in a given structure or system, which leads to their 
preservative sublation in a higher totality (a new structure or system). Instead 
Bhaskar argues that ‘dialectical processes and configurations are not always 
sublatory (ie. supersessive), let alone preservative’.13  
Nor is dialectic necessarily characterised by opposition or antagonism. On 
the contrary, as often dialectical processes and configurations are characterised by 
‘mere connection, separation or juxtaposition’.14 This means that dialectical 
consciousness consists of ‘the art of thinking the coincidence of distinctions and 
connections.
15
As Bhaskar puts it, dialectical mechanisms and configurations are 
‘[a]nything from any relation between differential elements to the absenting of 
constraints on the absenting of absences, or ills’.16 At the most abstract level, then, 
Bhaskar wishes to grasp dialectic as ‘any kind of interplay between differentiated 
but related elements’.17 But, more concretely, he wishes to define dialectic as a 
specific kind of process or configuration, the logic or dynamic of which is a 
function of its structure. Dialectic is structure-in-process and process-in-structure 
by virtue of the interconnections and oppositions which bring about the 
elaboration or transformation of a given system or totality or of some or more of 
its elements.  
Second, although Bhaskar recognises that Hegel describes reality as a 
‘differentiated totality’, his view is that the idealist and teleological logic of 
Hegel’s dialectic ends up denying this in practice. ‘Difference’ is subordinated to 
‘unity’ in Hegel’s system. Now Bhaskar wishes to reverse this order of priority. 
As Andrew Brown points out, for Bhaskar, given that each ‘stratum is constituted 
by its own sui generis causal powers (and liabilities), which can be adequately 
conceptualised in isolation from any concept of the root stratum’, it follows that 
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 ‘in reality there is nothing present in the emergent stratum connecting it to the root 
stratum. Because of this … it is the aspect of difference that requires emphasis 
within the critical realist ontology’.18 
Third, despite Bhaskar’s powerful – though arguably sometimes misplaced 
– attack on Hegel’s system (which, aside from the polemic against Hegel’s 
cognitive triumphalism, ontological monovalence and attendant theory/practice 
inconsistency, also rips into Hegel’s monism, his ‘logicisation of being’, his 
‘mysticism’, his ‘preservative sublationism’, his ‘centrism’, his ‘primal squeeze’, 
and other things besides),
19
 he nonetheless wishes to preserve the ‘rational core’ of 
Hegel’s dialectic.20 This is Hegel’s notion that dialectical process is essentially 
expressive of the logic of negation.  
Bhaskar wishes to grasp ‘negative dialectics’ as the ‘absenting of absence’, 
or more specifically ‘the absenting of constraints on absenting absences or ills’.21 
Bhaskar points out that the rational kernel of Hegel’s dialectic is its grasp of 
scientific development and conceptual thought generally as expressive of the logic 
of negating negativity (or absenting absence on Bhaskar’s gloss). But Bhaskar 
regards both subjective and objective dialectics as being characterised by the 
absenting of absence. Thus, although Bhaskar distinguishes between conceptual, 
social and natural dialectical processes (and their various subsets), he nonetheless 
regards all of these as energised by the logic of absence or negation. 
Ontologically, the process is synonymous with social and natural geo-history. 
Epistemologically, the process is synonymous with progress in philosophical and 
theoretical thought, particularly the logic of scientific discovery. Normatively-
practically, the process is precisely ‘the axiology of freedom’. 
Finally, Bhaskar wishes to both substantiate and radicalise this Hegelian 
insight. This he does by defining the central or basic dialectical category as ‘real 
determinate absence or non being’.22 ‘Negativity’, for Bhaskar, is thus grasped as 
‘the linchpin of all dialectics.’ He makes the claim that his ‘is the only system of 
dialectical philosophy … to sustain an adequate account of negativity … and 
[therefore] of dialectic itself’.23 But this absence or negativity is not simply a 
property of conceptual thought (or rather its incompleteness), but of the 
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 ontological status of reality itself. Bhaskar is against what he calls ‘ontological 
monovalence’, which he defines as a ‘purely positive, complementing a purely 
actual, notion of reality’.24 For Bhaskar the necessity of absence or non-being 
(‘negative dialectics’) is given by the open-ended nature of reality. Without 
absence or negativity there can be no dialectic, he argues. If negativity or absence 
were entirely cancelled out by positive being, the dialectic would cease, and with 
it change, development, evolution, emergence, leaving us with Hegel’s 
‘constellationally’ closed totality (‘endism’). 
At first sight, charging the founder of modern dialectics with ontological 
monovalence is logically indefensible. But, if one accepts Bhaskar’s interpretation 
of Hegel’s philosophy, his claim can be substantiated. On this view, Hegel’s 
negation of the negation eventually parcels itself out with the eventual historical 
reunification of subject and object. Hegel’s ‘master concept which drives his 
dialectics on (for the most part teleologically) – lack or absence … – is not 
preserved within his system … Positivity and self(-identity), the very 
characteristics of understanding, are always restored at the end of reason’.25 So 
Hegel’s ‘absenting of the notion of absence … checks genuine change, betrays the 
positivity of absolute idealism, and renders Hegel vulnerable to … ontological 
monovalence’.26 For Hegel, there was history, but there is no longer in capitalist 
modernity. Positive being reigns supreme.  
Overall, argues Bhaskar, ‘the chief result of ontological monovalence in 
mainstream philosophy is to erase the contingency of existential questions and to 
despatialise and detemporalise being’.27 Thus, Bhaskar would claim for Dialectic 
that it marks a decisive break with the dominant tradition in philosophy, 
commencing with Parmenides, which treats reality as entirely positive being. 
Bhaskar identifies ontological monovalence as the key philosophical error that 
Dialectic is concerned to combat, just as the epistemic fallacy was the key target 
of his earlier work in its pre-dialectical CR mode.  
Now, for Bhaskar ‘negativity is a condition of positive being’.28 Thus 
absence or non-being is ontologically fundamental or prior to presence or being:  
 
‘If a totally positive material object world – a packed world without 
absences – is impossible, there is no a priori reason to exclude the opposite 
– namely a total void, literally nothing. Negativity is constitutively essential 
to positivity, but the converse does not follow… Non-being is a condition of 
possibility of being. No non-being is a sufficient condition of possibility of 
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 being. But there is no logical incoherence in totally no being… if there was 
an originating Absolute, nothing would be its being or form.
29
 
 
Indeed, Bhaskar even goes so far as to say that non-being or absence is an ocean, 
whereas being and presence are merely the ripple on its surface. Real determinate 
absence or negativity energises the struggle for presence or positivity.
30
 This is the 
essence of dialectic. 
Bhaskar here also usefully distinguishes between three types of negation – 
‘”real negation, “transformative negation” and “radical negation”’.31 Of these ‘the 
most basic is real negation’, which denotes a wide range of things, including an 
‘absence from consciousness (eg. the unknown, the tacit, the unconscious)’, or ‘an 
entity, property or attribute (eg. the spaces in a text) in some determinate space-
time region’, or ‘a process of mediating, distancing or absenting’.32 Bhaskar sees 
real negation as the motor of dialectic, of which the other modes of negation are 
subsets. ‘Transformative negation refers to the transformation of some thing, 
property or state of affairs. Such a transformation may be essential or inessential, 
total or partial, endogenously and/or exogenously effected.’ This is a particular 
kind of real negation, though not all real negations are transformative. Such 
processes ‘involve the cessation or absenting of a pre-existing entity or state’.33 
These seem to fit the bill in accounting for processes of stratification and 
emergence generally, though here it seems to me that the determinate negations 
are inherently sublative. Finally, radical negation ‘involves the auto-subversion, 
transformation or overcoming of a being or condition’,34 and is a special case of 
transformative negation, and therefore of real negation. This is negation as self-
transformation. This mode of negation appears to fit the bill in accounting for 
processes of internally generated or ‘organic’ development or evolution, such as 
the dialectic of life or consciousness. 
Bhaskar’s account of negativity provides the basis of his analysis of 
contradiction. Bhaskar argues that the ‘concept of contradiction may be used as a 
metaphor (like that of force in physics) for any kind of dissonance, strain or 
tension’.35 Bhaskar identifies several different types of contradiction. The nodal 
meaning of contradiction ‘specifies a situation which permits the satisfaction of 
one end or more generally result only at the expense of another; that is, a bind or 
constraint.’ The concept of ‘internal contradiction’ refers to a ‘double bind or self-
constraint (which may be multiplied to form a knot). In this case a system, agent 
or structure, S, is blocked from performing with one system, rule or principle, R, 
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 because it is performing with another, R’; or, a course of action, T, generates a 
countervailing, inhibiting, T’. R’ and T’ are radically negating of R and T 
respectively’.36 Bhaskar sees such internal contradictions as essential to the 
possibility of emergent entities and of change as a self-implementing process 
inherent to its bearer.  
The concept of ‘external contradiction’ refers us to ‘the laws and constraints 
of nature (such as the speed of light), to be established by the mere fact of 
determinate spatio-temporal being’.37 In terms of society, the concept may perhaps 
also usefully refer to the inter-relations that exist between structures of a given 
social system or social formation, insofar as these are not relations of mutual 
presupposition (ie. internal and necessary connections between elements of a 
totality), but insofar as these entail mutual incompatibilities or strains between 
elements of the total system. The concept of ‘formal logical contradiction’ refers 
to a ‘type of internal contradiction, whose consequences for the subject, unless the 
terms are redescribed and/or the discursive domain is expanded, … is axiological 
indeterminacy’38 – ie. the lack of rational grounds for action.  
The concept of dialectical contradiction is also a species of internal 
contradiction, though of a different kind. This ‘may best be introduced as a species 
of the more general category of dialectical connections’.39 Dialectical connections 
require us to think in terms of ‘entity relationism’.40 These ‘are connections 
between entities or aspects of a totality such that they are in principle distinct but 
inseparable’.41 These are relations of existential presupposition, of intra-action 
rather than interaction, involving the permeation of co-constituents within a 
relationship or configurational whole. But dialectical contradictions, although 
possessing all of these features of dialectical connections, ‘are also opposed, in the 
sense that (at least) one of their aspects negates (at least) one of the other’s, or 
their common ground or the whole, and perhaps vice versa, so that they are 
tendentially mutually exclusive, and potentially or actually tendentially 
transformative’.42 Dialectical contradictions may be radical or transformative, 
depending on whether these negate the source of the existential incompatibility 
between elements of the totality or the common ground of the totality itself, or 
whether these accommodate or inform processes of dynamic restructuring which 
can be contained within a given totality or which do not sublate its common 
ground. 
 
 
                                                 
36
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 56. 
37
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 56. 
38
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 56. 
39
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 58. 
40
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 125. 
41
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 58. 
42
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 58. 
 Bhaskar and Marxian dialectic  
 
The moment of transition of Bhaskar’s Dialectic from critique of Hegelian 
dialectic to articulation of a system of dialectical critical realism begins with 
Bhaskar’s account of Marxian dialectic. Bhaskar endorses much of Marx’s 
critique of Hegel, this constituting the starting point of his own critique of Hegel 
and ‘dialectical enrichment and deepening of critical realism’.43 Bhaskar says that 
in Hegel contradictions are resolved or cancelled by being ‘retrospectively 
redescribed as moments of a transcending totality’,44 therefore being resolved in 
thought. Ultimately objective dialectical contradictions are dissolved into 
subjective logical contradictions, which are then transcended by virtue of progress 
in conceptual thought (the ‘logicisation of being’). This means that ‘Hegelian 
dialectic … is never simultaneously dialectical and contradictory’ (Ibid.).  
By contrast, ‘the materialist dialectic is’,45 says Bhaskar. Materialist 
‘dialectical contradictions … such as those identified by Marx in his systematic 
dialectics’, describe (dialectical), but do not suffer from (logical), contradictions 
… The practical resolution of the contradiction here is the non-preservative 
transformative negation of the ground’ of the internally relational but ‘tendentially 
mutually exclusive’ totality of which they are a part,46 this requiring the 
intervention of practical human agency in the social and material worlds. Marx’s 
critique of Hegel thus opens up the possibility of a ‘materialist diffraction of 
dialectic’, ie. the articulation of a pluriform dialectic, unfolding at various levels of 
conceptual thought and objective reality. This being the case, Bhaskar’s ‘four 
levels’ of dialectical critical realism are ‘perhaps best seen as four dimensions of 
this diffracted dialectic, each with its own distinctive concepts, scientific 
applications, and philosophical problems’.47 
But Bhaskar’s plural dialectic, though starting from Marx’s own diffraction 
of dialectic, extends far beyond it. Before examining the conceptual structure of 
DCR, and in order to better grasp its relationship with Marxism, is it is necessary 
to briefly consider the basic nature of Marxian dialectic. Materialist dialectic, as 
developed by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, is based upon certain fundamental 
principles of Hegel’s dialectic, which are defensible. Yet this classical Marxism 
does claim at the same time transform the manner of the application of these 
Hegelian concepts, in such a way that it correct to speak of an ‘inversion’ of 
Hegel’s dialectic. The ‘rational core’ of Hegel’s dialectic, for classical Marxism, is 
precisely the fundamental principles of ‘totality’, ‘mediation’, ‘change’ and 
‘contradiction’, which constitute the theoretical foundations of the Hegelian 
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 system.
48
 These can be seen at work in the methodological framework that informs 
all of the theoretical positions and specific explanatory hypotheses of Marx and 
Engels’ body of work, and are also manifest in Lenin and Trotsky’s philosophical 
commentaries on the nature of Hegelian and Marxian dialectic.  
Consider a single example: Marx’s ‘logic of capital’. Explanatory theory 
and method follow here a definite logic. First, capitalist society is grasped as a 
unitary system, a ‘rich totality of many determinations and relations’.49 The 
structural unity-in-difference of capitalism is given by a specific configuration of 
forces and relations and production. Second, Marx wishes to understand 
capitalism as a system in constant development and change, as following ‘laws of 
motion’, which are integral to its functioning as a particular mode of production, 
by virtue of the specific way the unity of particular forces and relations of 
production is accomplished.  
Thus Marx takes the classical economists to task for universalising 
bourgeois society, for treating the economic categories of capitalism as applicable 
to all previous societies, where these are regarded as undeveloped, and to all 
possible futures. For Marx, by contrast, ‘[e]conomic categories are only the 
abstractions of the social relations of production’,50 those of a historically specific 
and transitory form of society.  
Finally, Marx grasps the relationship between totality and change in 
capitalist society as mediated by the concept of ‘contradiction’. Capitalism is 
theorised as a ‘unity of opposites’, whose ‘law of motion’ is a function of the 
conflictual relationship between forces and relations of production (ie. the 
competition of ‘many capitals’ in the marketplace, and the tendency of the 
relations of production to fetter the development of the forces of production 
beyond a certain point), and between opposed social classes (ie. between the 
propertied bourgeoisie and the propertyless proletariat) over control of 
authoritative and allocative resources and the production process.  
The unity of capitalism exists because production and consumption, forces 
and relations of production, capital and labour, presuppose one another. There 
cannot be consumption without production, social labour without appropriate tools 
and technology, capital without wage labour, or vice versa. These are dialectical 
connections in Bhaskar’s sense. The contradictions of capitalism are derived from 
the manner in which the unity of economic elements - forces and relations of 
production, production and consumption, etc.- is accomplished in this specific 
mode of production. Capital and wage-labour, for example, constitute an 
opposition as well as a unity. This is because, although neither can exist in the 
absence of the other (capital is simply objectified labour; wage-labour is simply 
the means of capital accumulation), neither can they co-exist harmoniously. In 
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 part, this is due to the fact that the relationship between them is asymmetrical 
(wage labour exists only to service capital; and capital is structurally parasitic on 
wage-labour). But, in equal measure, this is due to the fact labour power as a 
commodity ‘is not detachable from the body/person of the wage labourer, so 
attempts by capital to use the “commodity” it has bought will inevitably bring into 
conflict with the person to whom this “commodity” remains attached.’ 51 These are 
internal transformative dialectical contradictions in Bhaskar’s sense. 
Engels made the point that ‘three laws’ of dialectic – the ‘unity of 
opposites’, the ‘transformation of quantity into quality’, and the ‘negation of the 
negation’ – can usefully be distilled from Hegel’s work.52 For Hegel, these are 
ways of specifying how dialectical processes unfold, though these concepts are not 
the only acceptable way of doing so, because not every dialectical process will fit 
the pattern they outline. Now there can little doubt that the classical Marxists 
adopt these basic analytical tools of Hegel’s dialectic, though again without 
assuming these capture or exhaust every dialectical process at work in the world.
53
 
But it is important to understand that they do so, not as a mechanical or 
deterministic formula adopted prior to research, into which real world processes 
have to be fitted, but rather as elements of an explanatory framework, based on the 
findings or knowledge of empirical science, which is also of practical efficacy in 
interpreting and organising research data.
54
  
For Marx, this is one sense in which the materialist dialectic can be 
legitimately said to invert the Hegelian. On this kind of interpretation, Hegel’s 
dialectic is basically a conceptually-driven dialectic, in which contradictions either 
arise from the limitations of human consciousness as it struggles to apprehend the 
world, or from the drive of ‘world spirit’ to force itself past the constraints of 
‘objective spirit’ (society and culture). In this process contradictions are eventually 
dissolved as thought finally appropriates the world as its own mirror, as identical 
to Spirit, or energises the practical struggles which hammers the objective world 
into correspondence with Reason or Spirit. This ensures that Hegel’s dialectical 
concepts are cast adrift from the disciplines of empirical testing and the possibility 
of refutation by scientific knowledge, since the starting point of Hegelian analysis 
is always the Idea, rather than the material world from which ideas are ultimately 
derived. So, although Hegel did illustrate dialectical processes with the latest 
scientific findings, this tended to be done in a fairly ad hoc way. Instead, Hegel’s 
dialectic arguably unfolds at the height of philosophical abstraction, presenting 
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 properties or objects of the material world as more or less developed forms of the 
general abstract concepts that are applied to them.
55
  
Thus, argues Marx, Hegel’s dialectic does reveal the contradictions that 
exist in categories and conceptual thought. The classic example of this would be  
the ‘unequal and opposed … shapes of consciousness’ of rulers and ruled, 
articulated in Hegel’s philosophy of history.56 Here the metaphysical identity of 
thought and being ensures that change is understood in terms of a dynamic of 
social consciousness rather than in terms of a dynamic of social relations.  
This can be illustrated by briefly examining Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic.
57
 At the beginning of the process, the lord is the dominant power. The 
lord ‘is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself’.58 
The servant is compelled, under fear of death, to labour in the service of the lord. 
So the servant ‘is the dependent consciousness whose essential nature is to live … 
for another’.59 The servant is mired in ‘servile thinking’, ie. the servant lives in 
fear of the lord, which is necessary for subsequent historical progress from 
‘barbarism’ to ‘civilisation’. But the servant’s labour on the object mediates the 
relationship between oppressor and oppressed, and this transforms the servant’s 
consciousness. By working on the material world in providing the lord with 
subsistence, the servant comes to realise his or her own independence from the 
world of objects (as producer of the things appropriated by another). Roles come 
to be grasped differently by the servant: the lord is actually dependent on the 
servant and falsely believes that (s)he is the independent power. ‘Through his 
rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his 
work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a 
mind of his own’.60 
Arguably, then, Hegel elides contradictions in social consciousness and 
contradictions in material social structure (contradictions in thought and wider 
social and material reality are seen as identical). This undermines the distinction 
between subjective and objective dialectics in Hegel’s philosophy and leads him 
into idealism. The point is well made by John Rees: 
 
[T]he dialectic of lordship and bondage confirms the idealist nature of 
Hegel’s analysis. Only the bondsman’s consciousness has been transformed, 
not his real relation to the lord. There has been a revolution in thought but 
no revolution in social relations. The Hegelian dialectic begins with the 
dominant consciousness of the lord and the subservient consciousness of the 
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 bondsman and ends with the transformed consciousness of the bondsman. 
The ’real world of existence’ and work is necessary, but only features as the 
mediating middle term.
61
  
 
So Hegel’s dialectic can be represented thus: consciousness (servile 
thinking) → labour on the material world → transformed consciousness 
(independent thinking). Each dialectical sequence begins and ends with 
consciousness. In practice, Hegel’s treatment of social consciousness and social 
relations as identical means that each phase of his dialectic implies a reconciliation 
of thought and objective reality, rather than a transformed social and material 
reality.  
Hegel himself did not understand this. This is because he did not see that 
material social structures always bound and limit forms of social consciousness, 
and that practical social struggles transform social consciousness only by virtue of 
transforming the social and material worlds. On the contrary, for Hegel, social 
consciousness is transformed not by virtue of a transformation of social conditions 
(the servant achieves ‘independent thinking’ in the absence of the overthrow of the 
social relations of slavery). This is the sense in which Hegel’s dialectic can be 
reasonably interpreted as driven by ideas: once a higher stage of Reason is 
attained, this ultimately ‘rules’ the practical struggles in the material world that 
bring about the reshaping of social institutions and objective culture to fit the 
dialectical movement of Reason. For Hegel, ascending states of consciousness, as 
these are translated into deeds, remodel the world, culminating in the emergence 
of free wage labour under capitalism, this constituting the terminus of his dialectic 
of history.  
In contrast to this idealist method, Marx and Engels insisted that their ‘point 
of departure’ is the material world, the object and instrument of human labour, 
from which all forms of consciousness are derived.
62
 Concepts are the product of 
real conditions, yet are distinct from these conditions, shaped by existential 
contradictions. They then have to be abstracted from their objects, and subjected 
to rational procedures of scientific testing, then reapplied to their objects in the 
form of more sophisticated concepts, if they are to apprehend the nature of real 
world processes or structures. Further, because contradictions exist outside 
consciousness, are independent of consciousness, and indeed often account for the 
contradictions in consciousness, existing in their own right in the structures of 
society and nature, it follows that objective reality and subjective reality cannot be 
elided. There is a unity between subjective and objective dialectics, not a simple 
identity.
63
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 For Marx and Engels, processes in nature unfold independently of thought 
and culture via real dialectical connections and oppositions, whereas 
contradictions in social consciousness are ‘bounded’ by and expressive of 
contradictions of material social relations. This situation can be contrasted with 
Hegel, for whom contradictions of social consciousness express and bound 
contradictions of real life. For Marx and Engels, the material struggles of social 
agents, as these are over-determined by structural social relations, bring about 
social transformations. Again, this can be contrasted with Hegel, for whom 
practical struggles in the material world act as the tool of Reason or Spirit to bring 
about social transformations.
64
  
For classical Marxism, then, consciousness is not the first and last term of 
the dialectic of human history, as it arguably was in Hegel, but is its mediating 
middle term. And this middle term is understood not as abstract Reason, but as 
conscious collaborative labour in the sensuous world, in the service of human 
needs and wants.
65
 Thus Marx’s dialectic can be represented as follows: material 
reality (social relations and physical conditions) → social consciousness → 
transformative social agency (constitutive labour and class struggle), leading to 
transformed social relations and social consciousness.  
This understanding allows us to grasp the manner in which the classical 
Marxists apply Hegel’s ‘three laws’ of the dialectic. In Hegel these are commonly 
interpreted as unfolding as a simple concept begets a more refined concept, which 
contains and transcends the simpler one, and so on, until the Idea is evolved into 
self-consciousness of the Absolute (the common rational structure of thought and 
the material world which Hegel understands as Absolute Spirit). In Hegel, 
furthermore, the historical process by which Spirit discovers or even constructs the 
world as its own creation is normally seen as essentially teleological, since the 
self-reconciliation of Spirit at the final stage of the dialectic is immanent in its 
beginning, the goal to which history gravitates, since this unfolds by virtue of 
logical necessity, as would a sequence of self-generating concepts. For classical 
Marxism, by contrast with this interpretation of Hegel’s logic, neither the 
transformation of quantity into quality, nor the negation of the negation, can be 
interpreted as teleological laws of necessity, whether in social or natural systems. 
Of course, making the assertion that classical Marxism is a fundamentally 
anti-teleological and non-deterministic body of social theory would be considered 
by many critical realists and dialectical critical realists as flying in the face of 
established academic knowledge. Yet those who assert as much often fail to 
distinguish the classical Marxist current which links together the theoretical 
practice of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Lukacs, Gramsci, Luxemburg and a 
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 handful of more contemporary authors located in the labour movement (which is 
opposed to fatalism and positivism), from the broader tradition of so-called 
‘orthodox’ Marxism, which includes the whole of Second International and 
Stalinised Marxism, irrespective of its (often positivistic and fatalistic) conceptual 
and methodological content.
66
 Moreover, it is a lamentable fact that this kind of 
understanding is grossly misinformed, shaped as it has been by the exigencies of 
Cold War politics (and now the spectre of a repentant communism and socialism 
in a world reputed to be ‘beyond left and right’)67 and their knock-on effects in 
academia, which includes a failure to approach central Marxian texts in the spirit 
of immanent critique, and worse still often evidence a lack of acquaintance with 
primary sources.  
But it is worth pointing out that the textual evidence in Marx and Engels’ 
oeuvre as a whole supporting the ‘orthodox’ interpretation is extremely flimsy. By 
and large, most of this is concentrated in the ‘early works’, prior to Marx and 
Engel’s first statement of historical materialism in The German Ideology, before 
their break with Hegel’s idealist philosophy of history. Now it seems a little 
foolish to criticise Marx for his conceptual and methodological failings before he 
had a chance to formulate the distinctive conceptual and methodological tools of 
Marxism. Yet even here in the ‘early works’ there is rather more in the way of 
textual data which undermines the orthodox critique. For example, in The 
Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts of 1844, which is often singled out as 
especially prone to teleology by the critics (and not without some justification), 
Marx insists that communism is not preordained by historical laws. ‘Communism 
as such is not the goal of human development’, but is rather ‘the “actual” phase 
necessary for the next stage in the process of human emancipation’, ie. the 
necessary stage of history if alienation is to be overcome.
68
  
If this is not clear enough, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels are 
utterly unambiguous that historical materialism has nothing in common with 
teleological historicism: 
 
History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations, each of 
which exploits the capital funds, the productive forces handed down to it by 
all preceding generations, and thus, on the one hand, continues the 
traditional activity in completely changed circumstances and, on the other 
hand, modifies the old circumstances with a completely changed activity. 
This can be speculatively distorted so that later history is made the goal of 
earlier history … Thereby history receives its own special aims and 
becomes ‘a person ranking with other persons’ … while what is designated 
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 with the words ‘destiny’, ‘goal’, ‘germ’, or ‘idea’ of earlier history is 
nothing more than an abstraction formed from later history.
69
 
 
So the fundamental problem with the view that Marxian dialectic is 
essentially teleological and ‘historicist’ (in Karl Popper’s sense of the term) is that 
it is compelled to exaggerate the significance of the existing empirical evidence in 
support of this position in Marx and Engels’ post-1845 writings to make any kind 
of case at all. Since passages which can be interpreted in an overly ‘deterministic’ 
and ‘fatalistic’ manner have such a marginal presence in Marx and Engels’ mature 
works, amounting to no more than a few passages in a voluminous output 
spanning thousands of pages of text, it becomes necessary to over-inflate their 
conceptual weight and explanatory significance to the point of absurdity. But, as I 
have shown at length elsewhere, even the marginal ‘deterministic’ aspects of Marx 
and Engels’ mature output can often be interpreted legitimately in a more 
charitable light (once placed in their textual context), since these tend to function 
simply as rhetorical embellishments to the unfolding of theoretical concepts, 
cutting against the grain of the analytical problematic in which they are situated.
70
  
An oft-quoted example of this is Marx’s brief sketch of the ‘expropriation 
of the expropriators’ in the third volume of Capital.71 This can be interpreted in a 
deterministic light, of course. But it can equally be read innocently as simply a 
statement of the necessary conjuncture of objective economic circumstances 
required to allow the replacement of capitalism with socialism.  
To offer a more obvious example, even Marx’s famous claim that ‘the 
Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes of production can be 
designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society’72 
‘should not necessarily be interpreted as a rigid stages theory of social evolution. 
Rather it can legitimately be understood as a broad historical sketch of successive 
economic modes that have presided over a cumulative development of humanity’s 
material productive forces’.73 This latter interpretation is supported by Marx’s own 
critique of vulgar Marxists, who are taken to task for subsuming history ‘under 
one great natural law’ and thus interpreting ‘my historical sketch of the genesis of 
capitalism in western Europe as [an] … historico-philosophic theory of the general 
path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which 
it finds itself’.74  
It is also important to note that often the most ‘deterministic’ passages (of 
those which can be labelled as deterministic) are to be found in the ‘propagandist’ 
(overtly political) rather than mature ‘scientific’ (sociological and philosophical) 
                                                 
69
 Marx and Engels 1970, pp. 57–8. 
70
 Creaven 2000b, pp. 7–11. 
71
 Marx 1967, p. 763. 
72
 Marx 1970, p. 21. 
73
 Creaven 2000b, p. 12. 
74
 Marx 1934, p. 42. 
 texts. Yet it should be obvious for contingent political reasons (ie. ‘rallying the 
troops’) that these are more prone to speak of the ‘historical inevitability’ of 
capitalist downfall and proletarian revolution. The obvious example of this, of 
course, is the famous ‘gravediggers’ comment in The Communist Manifesto.75 
 However, irrespective of the value of engaging in a more critical analysis 
of those Marxian passages that are superficially read as supporting the orthodox 
critique, it is certain that set against this flimsy and ambiguous evidence of 
Marxian ‘teleologism’ and ‘positivism’ (the positing of historical laws leading to 
necessary results) is a mountain of textual data and dense conceptual analysis 
supporting the opposite conclusions.
76
 Thus anti-Marxist critique has long been 
characterised by the tedious and dishonest practice of scouring Marxian texts for 
evidence of ‘original sin’, yanking these ‘sins’ out of context, and disregarding 
practically everything substantial that Marx and Engels ever wrote.  
I conclude that it is plain silly to attribute any determinate meaning to Marx 
and Engels’ writings as a whole on the basis of isolated passages from a wide 
range of texts, for good or for ill. Instead I concur with the opinion that these 
should always be analysed in terms of the conceptual and methodological structure 
of which they are a part, and considered in terms of their internal consistency with 
this structure. But, this having been done, the orthodox critique collapses.  
Now this interpretation of the dialectic as radically anti-positivist and non-
teleological follows from its ‘inversion’. That is to say, it follows its 
transformation from an idealist to a materialist dialectic. For transformative 
change is now grasped as the collision of social or physical oppositions, without 
the certainty that a specific resultant or fixed end-state must follow from initial 
causes or conditions, in advance of the developmental process itself, as would the 
conclusion of a problem in logic from its initial premises.  
As Trotsky puts it: ‘Human society has not developed in accordance with a 
prearranged plan, but empirically, in the course of a long, complicated and 
contradictory struggle’.77 This is equally true of physical and social systems. In 
both cases, the process of the transformation of quantity into quality, ie. the 
development of structural forms by means of internal and external contradictions 
and dialectical connections, does not necessarily resolve itself in the negation of 
the negation (the successive transcendence of lower by higher systems which 
nonetheless preserve in a modified form elements or properties of the lower). 
Now a number of points should be made about the nature of this materialist 
dialectic. First, I have already shown that it is not ‘endist’, ‘stageist’, ‘teleological’ 
or ‘historicist’. Second, it is anti-reductionist and anti-monist. That is to say, it is 
pluriform. This is obviously true of historical materialism.
78
 Nor is this any less 
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 true of dialectical materialism more generally. Here objective and subjective 
dialectics are unified but distinct properties of being; and objective dialectical 
processes and configurations do not constitute a uniform substance, but unfold 
relatively autonomously at a variety of different levels, in accordance with the 
distinctive relational properties of their objects or structures. Thus: the dialectic of 
capitalist modernity involves multiple configurations and contradictions;
79
 the 
dialectic of society is irreducible to the dialectic of life; the dialectic of life is 
irreducible to the dialectic of inorganic matter.
80
 Third, it derives enormous 
explanatory power from a precise, flexible, yet remarkably uncomplicated 
configuration of dialectical categories. Simplicity (as far as is possible in 
dialectical analysis!) is combined with excellent explanatory reach and 
circumnavigation of the fundamental errors that Bhaskar would attribute to 
Hegelian dialectic (including ontological monovalence, cognitive triumphalism, 
the epistemic fallacy, teleological determinism, etc.). 
These are especially important points to bear in mind as we consider the 
efficacy of Bhaskar’s radicalisation/ transformation/overreach of materialist 
dialectic. What is added to Marxian philosophy by Bhaskar’s highly complex 
DCR system that it previously lacked? And does the analytical and theoretical 
pay-off of Bhaskar’s DCR, in terms of the benefits its elaborate proliferation of 
dialectics provide for the social researcher, render it philosophically indispensable 
to Marxian social theory and emancipatory socialist politics? This is the claim 
Bhaskar would make for Dialectic. Before addressing this issue, however, it is 
necessary to grasp how Bhaskar’s diffraction of dialectic articulates at the distinct 
levels of his DCR system.  
 
 
The four levels of dialectical critical realism 
 
Bhaskar constructs his dialectical critical realism on the basis of his critique of 
Hegel’s dialectic of identity, negativity and totality. These Hegelian concepts are 
replaced with his own reworked dialectical concepts of non-identity, negativity, 
totality and transformative agency. These are mapped onto the ‘four levels’ of 
dialectical critical realism. The ‘first moment’ (1M) basically corresponds to the 
key concepts of critical realism (stratification, emergence, the non-identity of 
thought and being, systemic openness, etc.). The ‘second edge’ (2E) ‘is the abode 
of absence – and, most generally, negativity’.81 This entails the remodelling of 1M 
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 concepts ‘in the light of dialectical categories such as negativity, negation, 
becoming, contradiction, process, development and decline, mediation and 
reciprocity’.82 Bhaskar argues that this ‘dialectical moment’ is necessary to impart 
dynamism and movement to the relatively static or synchronic concepts of critical 
realism and to situate processes of change spatially and temporally. This is the 
‘reassertion of the geo-historicity of being, of tense and place as irreducible and 
spatio-temporality as real, of the tri-unity of space, time and causality in tensed 
spatializing process, of emergent, divergent, possibly convergent, causally 
efficacious spatio-temporalities and rhythmics, of the constitutive presence of the 
past and outside’.83 
The ‘third level’ (3L) corresponds to ‘totality’ and ‘totalising motifs’.84 The 
concept of totality denotes ‘intra-actively changing embedded ensembles, 
constituted by their geo-histories … and their contexts, in open potentially 
disjointed process’.85 And the ‘internal and intrinsic connectedness of phenomena 
deduced from the dialecticisation of 1M at 2E reveals the implicit need for 
totalising motifs which can theorise totality … and constellationality’.86 This gives 
rise to the ‘fourth dimension’ (4D): ‘the zone of transformative agency’,87 ‘the 
unity of theory and practice in practice’.88 This is the process of human practical 
engagement in the world, in society and nature, which also mediates the poles of 
consciousness and being, bringing thought into a ‘lived relation’ with the world, 
thereby transcending (though without harmonising) the abstract polarities 
represented by subject and object. Here Bhaskar discusses the range of erroneous 
interpretations of this ‘zone’ (physicalism, idealism, dualism, reification, 
fetishism, commodification), the classical errors of social theory, and the 
conceptual means of their resolution, which hinges on ‘emergent powers 
materialism’ at the level of subject and the dialectic of structure and agency at the 
level of society.  
The interface between (3L) and (4D) can also be interpreted as the 
‘moment’ of ‘dialectical critical naturalism’, the analysis and theorisation of 
human society as unity-in-difference, and maps on to Bhaskar’s famous 
‘transformational model of agency’. This is dialectical realism as sociology, 
politics and ethics. ‘Social life, qua totality, is constituted by four dialectically 
interdependent planes: of material transactions with nature, inter-personal action, 
social relations, and intra-subjectivity’.89 This is the ‘social cube’, a complex 
articulation of ensembles of structure-practice-subject in process. Here ‘we have 
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 dialectics of unity and diversity, of intrinsic and extrinsic, of part and whole, of 
centrification and peripheralization, within partial totalities in complex and 
dislocated open process, substantively under the configuration of global 
commodification’.90  
This ‘transformational model of social activity avoids the twin errors of 
reification and voluntarism in a dislocated duality of structure and agency, while 
the relational conception of social life evades the pitfalls of individualism and 
collectivism alike’.91 By duality (or ‘hiatus-in-the duality’ as he calls it) Bhaskar 
means ‘the combination of existential interdependence … and essential … 
distinction’.92 Like society and nature, human subjects are grasped as stratified and 
relational entities, not as ‘fixed and abstractable from their environment’, but ‘as 
‘existentially constituted by their rhythmics or geo-histories and the totality of 
their relations with other things’.93 
At this level too the concept of ‘power2’ relations is central to the analysis. 
These are defined as ‘generalised master-slave type relationships’.94 That is, social 
relations which govern the distribution of material goods, political and military 
authority, and cultural status (eg. stratification by class, gender and ethnicity). 
Power2 relations are those which enable human and social agents to defend their 
sectoral advantages by prevailing ‘against either … the covert wishes and/or … 
the real interests of others (grounded in their concrete singularities)’.95 These are 
to be distinguished from ‘Power1’ relations, which refer instead simply to the 
‘transformative capacity’ of human agency.96 Bhaskar also introduces his politico-
moral theory here, in which ‘concrete singularity’ (the free flourishing of each) ‘is 
the relational condition of concrete universality’ (the free flourishing of all). This 
is understood as ‘an immanent and tendential possibility … necessitated by 
structural conditions … [though] held in check by global discursively moralised 
power2 relations’.97 
Bhaskar argues that dialectic at this level is ‘the logic of freedom’.98 This is 
because dialectic imparts ‘a certain, if highly contingent, directionality to geo-
history, presaging a society in which the free flourishing of each is the condition 
for the free flourishing of all’.99 This is a progressive tendential movement of 
humanity towards ‘eudaimonia’ or universal emancipation. How does this work? 
The starting point is Bhaskar’s definition of dialectic as the process of ‘absenting 
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 absence.’ The next step is Bhaskar’s argument that ‘any ill can be seen as a 
constraint and any constraint as the absence of a freedom’.100 From this it follows 
that dialectic entails ‘absenting most notably of constraints on desires, wants, 
needs and interests’.101 At its simplest, then, dialectic is powered by the interface 
of absence and desire, since ‘absence is paradigmatically a condition for desire’, 
on the grounds that desire presupposes lack.
102
  
Now, for Bhaskar, humanity is bestowed with the ‘inner urge’ to struggle 
against lack ‘that flows universally from the logic of elemental … need, want’, 
and this is manifested ‘wherever power2 relations hold sway’.103 This is because 
power2 relations function to negate the needs of most human beings (whether 
basic survival needs or those defined by wider cultural horizons), giving rise to a 
desire for freedom from ‘absenting ills’. It is this process that offers the tendential 
possibility of moving ‘from primal scream to universal human emancipation’.104 
Since ‘every absence can be seen as a constraint, this goal of human autonomy can 
be regarded as implicit in the infant’s primal scream’.105 This is because the 
unfolding dialectic of absenting absence on freedom (as agents struggle against 
successive forms of power2 relations), in tandem with expanding cultural 
definitions of needs and wants constructed in part through this struggle, gives rise 
to a logic of more inclusive, englobing definitions of and aspirations towards 
freedom. 
These four ‘moments’ or ‘levels’ of dialectical critical realism are moments 
of its own progressive dialecticisation. ‘At the beginning of this new dialectic, 
there is non-identity - at the end, open, unfinished totality’,106 along with the unity-
in-difference of consciousness and being. This dialectical movement is regarded 
by Bhaskar as the antithesis of Hegel’s dialectic, where non-identity of 
consciousness and being is eventually transformed into its opposite. 
 
 
The balance sheet  
 
This concludes by account of the conceptual ‘nuts and bolts’ of Bhaskar’s DCR 
system and its philosophical underpinnings. I will now address the issue of the 
adequacy of Bhaskar’s Dialectic, of its relationship to Marxian dialectic, and thus 
its overall status in contemporary radical philosophy and social theory. First I will 
consider the strengths of DCR. Then I will consider its areas of weakness. The 
claim of DCR to stand as ‘new beginning’ for dialectical analysis and of providing 
                                                 
100
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 182. 
101
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 175. 
102
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 242. 
103
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 299. 
104
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 180. 
105
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 264. 
106
 Bhaskar 1993, p. 3. 
 Marxism with the formal specification of its dialectics will be considered in the 
light of my critique. 
 
 
1) Strengths and advantages 
 
The great power of Bhaskar’s Dialectic is that it does succeed in a number of 
important tasks it sets itself. First, it succeeds in strengthening the anti-reductionist 
credentials of critical realism. The understanding of reality as comprised of 
multiple totalities, in constant movement and change, is a powerful ontological 
barrier to anti-realism and cognitive triumphalism. Thus the critique of the 
epistemic fallacy is give a new slant and is considerably enriched. Second, 
Bhaskar’s DCR does demonstrate that the essence of dialectic (at least when 
applied to cognition, life and society) is the absenting of absence, and in so doing 
articulates an effective critique of ontological monovalence.  
The ingenuity of Bhaskar’s argument for treating absence as real, and as key 
to at least a particular class of dialectic, is that it establishes its point not by 
inference from perceptual criteria (I know from the fact that Pierre has been 
present in the café in the past that he is now absent from the café), or from causal 
criteria (absence as pure negativity must by definition lack causal efficacy), but 
rather on the grounds that it is simply impossible to conceive of change other than 
in terms of negativity. ‘All causal determination, and hence change, is 
transformative negation or absenting’.107 Third, and in large measure because 
‘negativity wins’ (though as we shall see only up to a point),108 Bhaskar’s dialectic 
does reveal the relatively static nature of critical realist concepts and breathe 
movement and life into them. 
Fourth, ontologically, Dialectic does present good arguments as to why 
theory cannot afford to abstract from space, time and the process of change, and 
offers the promise of a thoroughgoing historicization of stratification and 
emergence; and it does invest in these processes spatial and temporal context. 
Fifth, conceptually, a great deal of the theoretical and analytical content is 
interesting and challenging, particularly I would say at the levels of (3L) and (4D).  
Here Bhaskar does successfully argue the relevance of his reworked dialectical 
concepts of totality and negation and mediation to theorising the relational 
stratified self (as an ‘open ended’ construct of multi-layered geo-historical and 
socio-cultural processes) and the transformational model of social activity, of the 
interface between them, and of the dialectical interpenetration of consciousness 
and reality through practical constitutive human agency. 
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 Certainly, the remodelling of the transformational model of social activity 
as the ‘social cube’ seems to me to draw out the multi-dimensional texture and 
open-ended dynamism of social being. The abstract model of structure and subject 
of The Possibility of Naturalism and Reclaiming Reality is refashioned as a ‘rich 
totality of many determinations and relations’. This is a parts-whole, unity-in-
diversity, process-in-product, product-in-process mode of analysis, involving the 
interpenetration of subject, social practices and structural properties, in concretely 
situated processes of geo-historical development, powered by the dialectical 
interface between power1and power2 relations. A broadly progressive directional 
logic of social development, and with it a tendential impulse towards universal 
human freedom, is advanced, which I fully endorse.
109
 This is powered by the 
dialectic of absenting absence (in both ideal interests and practical interests), 
which seems consistent with the tendential structural impulse towards eudaimonia 
that Bhaskar proposes. 
Sixth, epistemologically, Bhaskar is right to see dialectic as the ‘great 
loosener’.110 Here he has done Marxism a great service by decisively rebutting the 
influential criticism ‘which claims that the notion of dialectical contradictions in 
reality is incompatible with … formal logic, coherent discourse, scientific practice 
or materialism.’ As Bhaskar rightly points out, ‘[t]his is not so’, for real 
contradictions ‘may be straightforwardly consistently described and explained 
[and] only if logical … contradictions are committed, as distinct from described, 
that the norm of non-contradiction is infringed’ (Bhaskar, 1998: 619). 
Epistemologically too, it does seem useful to grasp dynamism in conceptual ideas 
(whether these are philosophical or scientific or commonsense in nature) in terms 
of the ‘absenting of absence’, as both Hegel and Bhaskar recommend.  
Finally, as social ontology and analytical method, Bhaskar’s dialectic is 
broadly consistent with Marxian social theory. Bhaskar’s dialectic is based 
foursquare on the categorical rejection of what he sees as Hegel’s idealism. The 
dialectic he outlines is a property of the structures of material and social reality, 
and of the interplay of these with human consciousness, as this is mediated by 
practical human agency. Dialectic is not simply the autobiography of Reason, as it 
strides in a linear fashion along the path towards absolute self-knowledge. 
Contradictions are an objective property of the real, and these are not to be 
conflated with contradictions in thought or social consciousness, and nor treated as 
illusions sustained by the imperfections of rational knowledge. Bhaskar’s dialectic 
is materialist dialectic, in the Marxian sense. 
Nonetheless, Bhaskar’s dialectical critical realism is not without 
ambiguities, difficulties and substantial problems. I will address the ambiguities 
and lesser difficulties first, before then considering the more substantial problems.  
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2) Ambiguities, difficulties, etc. 
 
First, there is the question of the extent to which Bhaskar’s ‘second wave’ of 
realism is indispensable for Marxism, in order to provide it with the formal 
specification of its dialectics. Despite the brilliance of some of his individual 
insights and arguments, such is the high level of philosophical abstraction of 
Bhaskar’s Dialectic, and the bewildering array of unfamiliar concepts, positions, 
tropes, motifs, etc. it contains (many of which are not adequately theorised or 
argued), it is uncertain to what extent it has genuine practical utility in terms of 
furnishing social analysis with methodological or theoretical guidance, or under-
labouring a genuinely emancipatory political project, such as it claims to 
represent. Much of it seems simply superfluous (though much of it obviously 
isn’t) to the task of deploying dialectic effectively and incisively in social research 
or analysis.
111
  
This certainly could not be said to be a weakness of the work of the best of 
the classical Marxists. Here philosophy and social theory was always disciplined 
by its ‘lived relation’ with class struggles and the international labour movement, 
and hence by the litmus test of political practice.
112
 Although Marx himself did not 
find the time to submit his own dialectical method to systematic analysis, and did 
not theorise its points of contact with and departure from the Hegelian dialectic, 
his social theory is nonetheless an object lesson in applied dialectics. Certainly, it 
has yet to be surpassed by anything produced within critical realism.  
I have pointed out that Marx’s dialectic has the virtue of incisiveness and 
simplicity. It is as complex and comprehensive as it needs to be, no more. The 
same is true of the best work of the leading theoreticians of classical Marxism – 
especially Engels, but also Lenin, Trotsky, Lukacs and Gramsci, and a host of 
lesser figures. It is instructive that even today the bulk of the more interesting and 
innovative work in dialectical social theory is far more influenced by Marxism 
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 than Bhaskar’s dialectical critical realism.113 Engels’ dialectical materialism, 
though much maligned and misunderstood by philosophers and social scientists, 
has had and continues to have a significant impact on the thinking of a number of 
distinguished natural scientists,
114
 whereas the impact of Bhaskar’s alternative 
outside a narrow academic circle of professional philosophers and social analysts 
remains negligible. Indeed, even within the camp of critical realism, only a 
minority have read Dialectic, and even fewer profess to understand it. 
Part of the problem is that the book is appallingly written. As Alex 
Callinicos points out: 
 
Even as sympathetic a critic as Andrew Collier, who calls Bhaskar’s work 
‘the most exciting development in Anglophone philosophy in this half-
century’, admits that his recent writings have been characterised by a 
‘tendency to condense complex thought into brief formulae … combined 
with a large crop of unfamiliar expressions, acronyms and semi-formalised 
arguments (not to speak of typographic errors and sometimes obscure 
syntax)’. All of this and more is true of Dialectic, where neologisms and 
idiosyncratic uses of familiar terms proliferate until they form what verges 
at times on a private language. Arguments are illustrated by figures whose 
frequency and complexity obscure rather than instruct. And all too often 
Bhaskar’s prose becomes clogged by what seems the irresistible need to say 
everything, to add to some specific assertion references to connected 
considerations and qualifications until the original point is in danger of 
being lost… Perhaps this is a danger of all dialectical thinking … But the 
danger of trying to say everything is that one ends up saying nothing.
115
 
 
The theoreticism of Bhaskar’s Dialectic problematise its claim to under-
labour the social sciences or provide an emancipatory critique of either capitalism 
or ‘power2 relations’ more generally. It appears (often wilfully) inaccessible to all 
but the tiniest academic elite, and therefore has nothing to say to the billions who 
urgently require the ‘eudaimonistic society’ of which it speaks. This is a shame, 
because Bhaskar’s dialectic is the pulse of freedom. Today those who wish to 
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 struggle against globalised ‘master-slave type social relations’ are more likely to 
draw their inspiration from the new theoreticians of the anti-capitalist 
movement
116
 than from Bhaskar. This weakness is particularly lamentable given 
that Bhaskar’s reason for writing Dialectic was explicitly political. Thus, for him, 
socialism is undone because the required ‘unity of explanatory critical social 
theory and emancipatory axiology’ has yet to be achieved. ‘This is the ultimate 
absence this book aims to repair’.117 
However, there is more to explaining the book’s uncertain status and limited 
appeal than its difficult prose.
118
 More seriously, despite a wealth of condensed 
analysis, and many original and intriguing insights on the nature of dialectic, and 
despite its comprehensive (though sometimes misplaced) critique of Hegel, too 
many of the arguments it contains are simply perfunctory or under-theorised, 
either excessively condensed or extremely brief, in the latter case often little more 
than scattered jottings. Overall, then, there is an unfortunate tendency to present 
arguments which are simply lacking in supporting arguments or illustrations. For 
example, Bhaskar’s treatment of the way in which communication presupposes the 
possibility of human liberation, his demonstration of the ontological primacy of 
non-being over being, his positive argument against the denial of intransitivity, his 
argument against Leibniz’s principle of non-contradiction in being as well as 
thought, and against Kant’s notion of unitary time, and attempts more generally to 
demonstrate complex arguments with resort to cursory ‘transcendental proofs’, all 
of these fall into these sorts of category.  
Sometimes the over-compressed and sketchy character of Bhaskar’s 
analysis raises more questions than it answers. This is especially apparent at the 
level of his dialectical critical naturalism. Here there are a number of difficulties 
and ambiguities. First, when addressing the role of structural properties in social 
systems, there is uncertainty over whether Bhaskar sees these as indispensable to 
every intentional act of human agency or whether he thinks ‘natural interaction 
can supply the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentionality’.119 Second, it 
is also unclear whether Bhaskar sees social structures as existing materially only 
by virtue of the social agency and concepts which reproduce them or whether 
these structures are to a certain extent autonomous of and efficacious apart from 
the social activities and concepts of those subject to their influence or governance.  
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 Bhaskar’s description of the relationship between structure and agency as 
duality is suggestive that he favours the former answer in both cases. This 
impression is reinforced by his claim that the analysis of the interrelationship 
between structure and interaction in social systems requires not analytical dualism 
(the investigation of the interconnections between ontologically distinct realities) 
but ‘perspectival shifts’ from one ‘side’ or ‘dimension’ of a unitary though 
internally differentiated whole to another (either agency-within-structure, or 
structure-within-agency). Certainly, this interpretation is not decisively rebutted in 
his earlier work,
120
 despite his claim that:  
 
People and society are not related dialectically. They do not constitute two 
moments of the same process. Rather they refer to radically different 
things.
121
 
 
This is because Bhaskar also argues that social structures ‘only exist in 
virtue of the activities they govern … and cannot be identified independently of 
them’ and that ‘they do not exist independently of the conceptions that the agents 
have of what they are doing in their activities’.122 This seems to be suggestive of a 
close affinity between Bhaskar’s transformational model of social action and 
Giddens’ structuration theory, the latter of which endorses a ‘simultaneity model’ 
of the subject-society connection, according to which structural properties and 
self-identity are simply ‘two sides’ of the same coin of ongoing social practices.123  
If so, however, Bhaskar’s model is inadequate. The capacity of individuals 
to act intentionally and rationally is a function of subject – object interactions 
generally (mediated by practical interests), rather than simply of social interaction 
and enculturation.
124
 Structural properties (eg. distributions of property and 
cultural capital) often persist in the absence of agency that would reproduce them, 
and despite the concerted efforts of collective social action to remove or 
ameliorate them. This is because they are the emergent properties of the ‘dead 
generations’ and confront the living as pre-structured distributions relatively 
independent of and resistant to their will.
125
  
More seriously still, there simply isn’t enough in the way of startling new 
insights into the nature and application of materialist dialectic to justify the 
‘under-labouring’ status as provider of a new philosophical foundation for 
Marxian social theory and the social sciences generally some would claim for it 
(and which Bhaskar himself hints at). Three examples will have to suffice.  
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 First, we have seen already that Bhaskar deems Hegel’s dialectic 
inadequate, because Hegel’s cognitive triumphalism ensures that totality for him 
‘is constellationally closed … an achieved identity’,126 meaning that the entirety of 
being is in principle conceivable or knowable. Bhaskar is right to reject this 
absolutist conception of totality (though whether this critique of Hegel hits the 
mark is another issue). He points out that new ‘base’ strata may yet be discovered 
and that higher strata will undoubtedly emerge, so the totality is never complete or 
conceivable in its entirety. Yet Engels also rejects the fantastic notion of a 
complete or closed totality, and for the same reason, because reality for him is a 
combinatory of open systems in continual motion and change, meaning that 
knowledge can only approximate to reality without ever exhausting or mirroring 
it. As Engels puts it: ‘From the moment we accept the theory of natural evolution 
all our concepts … correspond only approximately to reality. Otherwise there 
would be no change. On the day when concepts and reality completely coincide … 
development comes to an end’.127  
Second, Bhaskar’s observation that dialectical logic cannot simply replace 
conventional scientific methods or formal logic, but must ‘build … on the later, 
overreaching but not transcending it, while the latter is at a loss without the 
former’,128 is an interesting and defensible argument. Without subjecting theory 
and practice to ‘dialectical overreach’, the result is invariably TINA (‘there is no 
alternative’ syndrome), the fabrication of ‘internally contradictory, more or less 
systemic, efficacious … ensembles … displaying duplicity, equivocation, extreme 
plasticity … and rational indeterminacy’.129 But, again, this insight does not seem 
radically different from Trotsky’s own view of the appropriate relationship 
between dialectical method, science and logic. Trotsky argued that formal logic 
was adequate within certain limits, but became lost in insoluble contradictions 
when addressing ‘more complicated and drawn out processes’,130 this often forcing 
the theorist to complement formal logic with arbitrary and external empirical 
modifications that often contradicted or broke the chain of logical concepts. The 
solution was a systematic interrogation and integration of abstract logic and 
empirical science by and through dialectical reasoning.
131
 Trotsky pointed out that 
this does ‘not replace concrete scientific analysis’. Instead it ‘directs this analysis 
along the correct road’.132  
Third, Bhaskar contrasts Hegelian dialectic to Marxian dialectic, the latter 
of which is rightly neither treated neither as idealist nor teleological. Bhaskar 
argues that Marx replaces Hegel’s concept of the ‘identity of opposites’ with the 
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 concept of the ‘unity of opposites’, since this is necessary to head off the danger of 
either a materialist or idealist regress. As Bhaskar puts it: ’One might be tempted 
to contrast here the Kantian independence, Hegelian identity and Marxian unity of 
opposites …Marx’s dialectical contradictions cannot be said to constitute an 
identity, but at most a grounded unity, of opposites … Marx’s concern is with the 
dialectical explanation and practical transformation of capitalism, not with the 
transfigurative redescription of, and reconciliation to … the existing state of 
affairs …’.133  
Bhaskar is right about Marx, of course. Marx applies his reworked concept 
of the ‘unity of opposites’ to great effect in his analysis of the logic of capital. For 
example, in his discussion of the classical liberal political economy of John Stuart 
Mill, Marx argues: ‘Where the economic relation – and therefore the categories 
expressing it – include contradictions, opposites, and likewise the unity of 
opposites, he emphasises the aspect of the unity of the contradictions and denies 
the contradictions. He transforms the unity of opposites into the direct identity of 
opposites’.134 But the same point is a commonplace within the wider classical 
Marxist tradition, which Bhaskar does not acknowledge, giving the impression 
that his interpretation is a novel one. 
Engels, too, seems to prefer this formulation to the ‘identity of opposites’, 
referring to the ‘unity of thought and being’ and the ‘unity of nature and mind’.135 
I have outlined elsewhere how his dialectic of nature negates in practice the idea 
that subjective and objective dialectics constitute a unitary substance or logic.
136
 
Lenin remarked in his Philosophical Notebooks that Marxists should replace the 
concept of the ‘identity of knowing and being’ with the concept of the ‘unity of 
knowing and being’.137 And Trotsky built his own reconstructed dialectic around 
this insight of Lenin’s.  
This, for example, is what he had to say about the matter in his 
Philosophical Notebooks:  
 
According to Hegel being and thinking are identical (absolute idealism). 
Materialism does not adopt this identity – it premises being to thought … 
The identity of being and thinking …signifies the identity of subjective and 
objective logic, their ultimate congruence. Materialism accepts this 
correspondence of the subjective and the objective, their unity, but not their 
identity; in other words it does not liberate matter from its materiality, in 
order to keep only the logical framework of regularity, of which scientific 
thought (consciousness) is the expression.
138
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Of course, whether all of this is interpreted as a problem for Bhaskar’s 
enterprise depends on how one defines the purpose of his project in Dialectic. If 
Bhaskar intended his contribution as an systematic enrichment or development of 
Marxian dialectic, rather than as a dialectical reworking of Marxism, or as 
specifying a realist alternative to or supercession of materialist dialectic, then in 
this case the difficulties reduce to mere ambiguities as to the status of its 
relationship with Marxism. At times Bhaskar does seem to identify his role as 
systematically developing and enriching Marx’s ideas – hence his oft-quoted 
reference to Marx as ‘the comet of critical realism.’ But elsewhere his grandiose 
claim for Dialectic that it provides the only adequate account of dialectic cuts 
against this interpretation. Since it is uncertain what kind of status more generally 
Bhaskar wishes to attribute to his DCR system in relation to Marxian dialectic, the 
misgivings I have raised appear noteworthy.  
Certainly, the points of contact between Bhaskar’s realist dialectics and the 
materialist dialectics of many leading figures of classical Marxism (as highlighted 
above) are not generally acknowledged by Bhaskar, this giving the impression that 
they are seen by him as novel to his own system. Further, despite a generally 
positive appraisal of Engels’ ‘three laws’ of ontological dialectic, Bhaskar is 
generally dismissive of dialectical materialism.
139
 Since Bhaskar would claim for 
DCR the role of philosophically under-labouring the social sciences, and of 
sublating all previous dialectical philosophy,
140
 this does appear to hint at a rather 
more ambitious project than simply the systematic elaboration or justification of 
Marx’s materialist dialectic. After all, though methodologically undeveloped, 
Marx does articulate philosophical foundations of his own for historical 
materialism, and these have undergone elaboration at the hands of other leading 
figures of classical Marxism, notably Engels and Trotsky. Yet Bhaskar does not 
identify his project as contributing to the development of this tradition of 
materialist philosophy (Lenin and Trotsky are not discussed at all, nor the 
contemporary left Darwinians, who have developed and applied Engels’ 
ontological dialectic in the biological sciences). 
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 In any case, whatever Bhaskar’s intentions, it is legitimate to observe that 
much of the real value of Dialectic is not that it revolutionises or transcends or 
outflanks the Marxian dialectic, or that it develops a radically new critique of 
Hegelian dialectic. Indeed, much of Bhaskar’s critique of Hegel is unoriginal, 
even if one concludes that it is insightful, though treated with a critical realist 
gloss. Nor is Bhaskar’s dialectic foundational to Marxian dialectic. This is because 
Bhaskar’s dialectical critical realism undoubtedly suffers from areas of damaging 
weakness (aside from its constipated academicism and its lofty level of conceptual 
abstraction), which are simply not to be found in Marxian dialectic. Further, it 
would itself be considerably enriched by virtue of a serious engagement with 
Engels’ dialectical materialism,141 not least because Engels’ materialist dialectic is 
in some important respects ontologically and methodologically consistent with it, 
whilst suffering from none of its damaging abstractionism.  
Rather, the significance of Bhaskar’s Dialectic is that it draws out, refines 
and systematises the conceptual logic of Marxian dialectic (at least in certain 
respects), and that it synthesises a formidable range of critical perspectives on 
Hegel, including Marx’s, which are then organised and interpreted through the 
framework of Bhaskar’s new and distinctive conceptual vocabulary. Yet there is 
some doubt over the adequacy of aspects of Bhaskar’s critique of Hegel (in part 
because it is based on Marx), which unfortunately I cannot go into here. 
Nonetheless DCR is a decisive advance on CR, notwithstanding my critical 
comments, since a serious engagement with Hegelian and Marxian dialectic has 
considerably broadened and sharpened Bhaskar’s critique in ways already 
described. But this should not distract us from recognising that the conceptual and 
analytical foundation of Dialectic is the path breaking Marxian critique of Hegel, 
or from grasping it as an extension and refinement of this critique, which is 
concerned with drawing out of its philosophical implications. Marxian dialectic is 
foundational to DCR, not vice versa. 
 
 
3) Problems and defects 
 
Enough said about some of the difficulties or ambiguities of Bhaskar’s dialectic. 
What of the more substantial problems I alluded to earlier? There are five in 
particular, or so it seems to me. First, on the terrain of critical naturalism, 
Bhaskar’s over-generalising concept of ‘master-servant type social relations’ is 
simply not adequate to the task of unravelling the complex relational 
determinations of the various axes of social power. What is the nature of the 
structured relationship between the various modes of domination, for example 
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 those of class, gender, and ethnicity? Are the different modes autonomous factors 
of social power, or are they hierarchically structured in social systems by virtue of 
stratification and emergence? Which modes of domination, if any, have 
explanatory primacy in determining the overall socio-historical trajectory of social 
systems? Is Marx’s base – superstructure model of structural causality in social 
systems of any practical analytic use in social theory? 
Now getting questions of this kind right is indispensable to formulating an 
adequate social theory and emancipatory political practice. So too is obtaining a 
secure theoretical grasp of the nature and efficacy of agential properties and 
powers, of those of social structures, and of the interrelationship between them. 
After all, socialist practice has often been strung between the poles of political 
passivity or fatalism (influenced by the economic determinism of some forms of 
Marxism) and political adventurism (influenced by the humanist revolt against 
determinism and fatalism). Kautskyism and Third Worldism are classic examples 
of the opposing tendencies.
142
 Yet Bhaskar’s exploration of ‘power2’ relations and 
social being more generally is far too condensed and abstract to deal with these 
sorts of questions and issues. Where he does refer to some of them, his treatment 
is rather insubstantial, consisting in assertion rather than theoretically and 
empirically informed argument.  
A central claim of classical Marxism is, I think, the proposition that modes 
and relations of production, where these give rise to asymmetrical distributions of 
property, give rise to forms of domination other than class, such as stratification 
by gender and ethnicity. My argument
143
 is that Bhaskar’s own CR concepts of 
stratification and emergence invest real theoretical content in this thesis, allowing 
a ‘vertical’ materialist explanation of non-economic modes of domination without 
‘explaining them away’ or denying them autonomous causal powers or real-world 
effects. This allows Marx’s base-superstructure model of society to be placed on a 
defensible conceptual footing.  
A second important claim of historical materialism, which lends theoretical 
support to Marx’s understanding of structural causality, is that class-based 
relations of production play the decisive role in determining the distribution of 
authoritative and allocative resources, and hence defining the vested interests and 
life chances of agents, in most historical social formations. I have shown too that 
this position is theoretically and empirically defensible.
144
 This thesis provides the 
hinge that connects up Marx’s base-superstructure model with his materialist 
theory of history. This allows a ‘class struggle model’ of epochal structural or 
systemic transformations, supporting a tendential directionality in societal 
development from less advanced to more advanced socio-economic forms, such as 
that articulated by historical materialism.
145
 So Marx’s ‘primacy thesis’ is certainly 
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 heuristically defensible, I would say conceptually plausible, and it can be 
corroborated empirically by comparative and historical sociological research. 
Now Bhaskar argues for neither of these positions. In fact, he seems to share 
the neo-Weberian view that society is comprised of a plurality of autonomous 
power centres or modes of domination, none of which can be legitimately 
attributed any kind of explanatory primacy over the others. If so, however, 
Bhaskar does not argue this position. Rather it is taken for granted. Instead he 
accuses Marx of being ‘fixated on the wage-labour/capital relation at the expense 
of the totality of master-slave relations … most obviously those of nationality, 
ethnicity, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, age, health and bodily 
disabilities generally’.146 If Bhaskar is saying that the Marxist tradition has 
neglected generalised master-slave type social relations, he is simply mistaken. 
Marx himself sketched out the rudiments of a materialist understanding of racism, 
and racism has received much theoretical scrutiny since within Marxism.
147
 Engels 
attempted (more successfully than he is often given credit for) a materialist 
explanation of women’s oppression,148 and much good work has been done to 
build on his analysis by a number of Marxists and non-Marxists up until the 
present day.
149
  
But, of course, those who accuse Marxism of ‘neglecting’ modes of 
domination other than class and economy normally mean something other than 
neglect. What they actually mean is that Marxism is wrong to posit: (1) an 
explanatory reduction of modes of stratification generally to modes of production 
and class domination; and (2) that modes of class domination have explanatory 
primacy in shaping political agency and hence systemic dynamics in most 
historical contexts. This is the point at issue, which is obscured by the language of 
‘neglect’ or ‘fixation’, and the tendency within anti-Marxist social theory to 
simply assume as a matter of commonsense that asserting either (1) or (2) is 
tantamount to economic determinism or ‘greedy’ class reductionism.   
But I suppose that Bhaskar’s claim can be read innocently as simply calling 
attention to the fact that not all power2 relations are class relations. To do so, 
however, seems a little naïve. After all, that this should be asserted so forcefully 
against Marx, in the context of the ‘retreat from class’ in the western academy and 
politics, and where the overwhelmingly dominant trend in social theory has 
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 asserted that class has no priority at all on the strength of the reality of plural 
modes of domination, seems instructive as well as unfortunate. But Marx’s 
position is a weakness only if relations of production/ structures of class 
domination do not have the kind of explanatory primacy in social systems 
specified by his theory. If Marxism is correct to specify the primacy of class 
relations and modes of production in constituting social systems, including other 
modes of domination, it is hardly a ‘fixation’ to concentrate analysis primarily on 
them. In Dialectic Bhaskar does not consider this possibility at all. Moreover, his 
claim that ‘religious affiliation, …age, health and bodily disabilities’ are modes of 
master-slave type relationships in their own right, hence presumably equivalent to 
those of class, gender and race, is frankly implausible and deprives the concept of 
power2 relations of much of its critical edge.
150
 
Second, Bhaskar’s abstractionism seems especially damaging to his moral 
realism. Bhaskar argues that the task of politics and philosophy is to help bring 
about universal human freedom. The problem is that ‘universal human flourishing’ 
or the ‘free development of all’, though a laudable ideal to be aimed at, is probably 
unattainable as an absolute. Even in a genuinely socialist society, where power2 
relations have been eradicated, individuals cannot enjoy absolute freedom in the 
sense of a total ‘absence of absenting constraints’ on their desires and wants. Even 
the most participatory and transparent forms of democracy, accompanied by the 
most radical redistributions of wealth, will not exclude specific policy-decisions 
that prioritise certain goals (and hence wants) at the expense of others, allocating 
resources here for this rather than there for that. The most that can be legitimately 
aspired to (and it’s a big aspiration) is that the structured modes of domination that 
systematically subordinate the cultural and material needs of the global human 
population in the service of the vested interests of powerful elites can be 
dissolved, and replaced by a rational social order that combines socialised 
production and property ownership with participatory and representative 
                                                 
150
 This has not stopped some Marxists trying to claim Bhaskar’s dialectical critical naturalism 
for historical materialism. In his Plato, Etc., Bhaskar does affirm that the Marxist thesis of the 
‘primacy of the mode of production and reproduction’ is ‘heuristically acceptable’ Bhaskar 
1994, pp. 101–2. Does this make him a historical materialist up at least until 1994? Probably 
not. There is no positive affirmation here of the primacy thesis or substantive analysis of how it 
might hold. Yet in Dialectic Bhaskar does appear to endorse the view that the capital-labour 
relation is the central dynamic of capitalism, and he does refer here to the global cultural 
domination of commodification. Again, some have taken this as a tacit endorsement on his part 
of the primacy thesis. But this is questionable. Both Weberians and postmodernists are often 
happy enough with the idea that the commodification of culture is a global master trend. A 
culture of commodification may well be a ‘fateful power’ of contemporary society, but this does 
not rule out the possibility that there are other ‘fateful powers’ of equal weight and significance 
besides. Since Bhaskar regards capitalism as just one nexus of power relations amongst a 
plurality of others, asserting the centrality of class relations here in the economic sphere is not 
the same thing as asserting their primacy in stratification systems per se. I conclude there is little 
that is distinctively Marxian about Bhaskar’s substantive social theory. 
 democracy in all substantive institutional spheres. This is Marx’s communism. It 
is not paradise, not ‘the ideal’, nor devoid of conflict, but it is nonetheless an 
inspiring political and ethical goal, and one which is practically achievable. 
Bhaskar’s contrary view that eudaimonia denotes the unity of humankind in 
freedom and enlightenment does not seem radically different from Hegel’s 
postulation of the identity of subject and object as the telos of history. This 
utopianism is pushed a further step forward in Bhaskar’s From East to West. Here 
he argues that  
 
man is essentially God (and therefore also essentially one, but also 
essentially unique); and that as such, he is essentially free and already en-
lightened, a freedom and enlightenment which is overlain by extraneous, 
heteronomous determinations which both (a) occlude and (b) qualify this 
essential fact… Man has to shed both the illusion that he is not essentially 
Godlike and free and the constraining heteronomous determinations 
(constituting the object world of illusion, duality and alienation) which that 
illusion grounds… The fundamental malaise then is self-alienation… To 
break free from it is to become what we most truly are… To change the 
world, man only has to realise himself … To become free all we need to do 
is shed our illusions. These are the chains that bind us to the presence of the 
past. It is time to let go, to live life afresh. The hour for unconditional love 
has struck.
151
 
 
The problems with this kind of abstract unhistorical moralism are threefold. 
First, it seems to dissolve the structural and cultural constraints which impede both 
unalienated consciousness and the construction of ‘concrete utopias’ as 
institutional realities. For these objective structures are now interpreted as being 
rooted in alienation and illusion, rather than as material causes of alienation and 
illusion in their own right. Second, given the stratified and open-ended nature of 
reality, and given that human knowledge is always culturally and socially 
constrained (and enabled) within determinate material circumstances, it follows 
that ‘enlightenment’ as a transcendental ideal is unrealisable. Our enlightenment 
will always be radically partial and incomplete.  
Finally, unlike ‘God’, whose essence is ‘spirit’, humanity is the product of 
natural evolution at a certain level of its material development. This means that the 
essence of humankind is the specific nature of its materiality and those emergent 
properties that are rooted in this materiality. So our emancipatory potential is not 
absolute or totalising, but is bound within the structure of powers and liabilities of 
our human nature. The essential liabilities of our humanity include those we share 
with all living things (our dependence for sustenance on a material world that 
frustrates as well as facilitates our wants, the likelihood of serious illness and 
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 infirmity, the possibility of injury or disability, the certainty of death), plus others 
more specific to ourselves as people (the psychological insecurities that follow 
from absences in knowledge or understanding, the fear of mortality, loneliness, 
bereavement, unrequited love, the multitude of personal failings or imperfections 
that we all have and which sometimes dog our interactions with others and prevent 
us fully realising our potentials, and so on). The essential powers of our humanity 
consist not simply of ‘consciousness’ or ‘spirit’, but of the biologically based 
needs and interests common to human beings across space and time, those causal 
powers of sociality and labour that are specified by this embodied human 
constitution, and those subjective emergents of mind, self and rationality (plus 
their emergent properties of culture and language) that have arisen from the 
historical interface between these natural powers and tendencies and the object-
world mediated by practical agency.  
So, contrary to Bhaskar, it is not the case that human beings are 
fundamentally free, but find themselves in chains. There is not a simple opposition 
between power and desire. Rather, humanity is essentially and simultaneously free 
and unfree. The task of realist ethics and politics should not be to mystify this 
existential reality, but to evaluate societies and systems of social relations in 
accordance with the respective relative degree of ‘free flourishing of each and all’ 
they allow their peoples. This is one of the tasks I set myself in my Marxism and 
Realism.
152
 This allows the ethical case for eudaimonia to be based on more 
substantive philosophical grounds, informed by the relevant human and biological 
sciences. Thus the historical necessity of socialism (in the moral sense) may be 
grasped on the basis of the greater correspondence of social forms to essential 
human interests it permits, as these are defined by the interface of biological and 
cultural needs mediated by the level of development of the material productive 
forces. Because socialism entails the abolition of power2 relations, the real 
potential it offers humanity is that of the maximum possible autonomy and free 
flourishing of each as the condition for the free flourishing of all within the hiatus 
of freedom-within-unfreedom.  
This concludes my critique of Bhaskar’s moral realism. What of the other 
difficulties I alluded to? Second, and at a rather more mundane level, where 
Bhaskar ventures beyond Hegel to make a critique of classical materialist 
dialectic, this is one of the least successful aspects of his enterprise. A major bone 
of contention is certain aspects of Bhaskar’s interpretation of the Marx-Hegel 
connection. For example, Bhaskar suggests that, under the influence of the closed 
Hegelian totality, ‘neglect of external contradictions and more generally 
constraints … has been a damaging feature of Marxian social theory in the 
Hegelian mode’.153 It is not clear what Bhaskar has in mind by his qualifying 
remark of ‘in the Hegelian mode’, since ‘Hegelian Marxism’ refers as much to the 
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 broader tradition of dialectical Marxist social theory (which is opposed to the 
mechanical materialist Marxist current of the Second International and Stalinism 
and some forms of Trotskyism) as it does to the humanist current especially 
characteristic of ‘western Marxism’, with which the term is sometimes associated. 
Bhaskar makes the same kind of point where he suggests that Marx, under the 
influence of Hegel, concentrated overmuch on internal contradictions.  
Undoubtedly, Marx did focus on the internal (especially dialectical) 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, because his purpose was 
precisely demonstrating that these contradictions were essential or necessary to the 
logic of capital. This is exactly the strength of his critique of political economy. 
Yet Bhaskar himself demonstrates that ‘Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of 
identity permits a plurality of dialectical configurations, topologies, perspectives 
and inscapes which …[cannot] be captured by a single formula’.154 He goes on to 
show how Marx’s ‘concept of contradiction is deployed to denote inter alia: (a) 
logical inconsistencies or other … theoretical anomalies …; (b) … non-dialectical 
oppositions …; (c) structural … dialectical contradictions … intrinsic to a 
particular social form; (d) geo-historically specific dialectical contradictions that 
bring into being a social form and/or crises in the course of its development which 
are then resolved in the process of transformation which they help to cause’.155 
This suggests that Bhaskar’s critique of Marxism cannot apply to Marx himself. 
In fact, Bhaskar’s discussion of the various kinds of contradiction that exist 
in reality (logical, internal, external, dialectical), is a genuinely interesting and 
ingenious aspect of his dialectic (though there is a question mark over its 
originality – some of it recalls ‘Hegel’s discussion of the various attitudes of 
thought to objectivity at the beginning of the Encyclopaedia Logic’),156 and a real 
enrichment of Marx’s ‘materialist diffraction of dialectic’.157 Nonetheless he does 
not establish the veracity of his initial critique of materialist dialectic in classical 
Marxian theory more generally as over-simple.  
Dialectical materialism, as developed by Engels, Trotsky, Ilyenkov, and 
more contemporary figures (such as the left Darwinians), is radically anti-
reductionist, rejecting the fantastic notion of a universal dialectic, and denying the 
relevance of attempting to apply the ‘orthodox’ triadic dialectic outside the realm 
of human cognition. Not only in Marx, but also implicit in Engels, is the idea that 
internal contradictions do not exhaust reality and are not the only mechanisms of 
structural transformation. Engels’ Marxism, for instance, identifies logical 
contradictions (in the philosophy and politics of adversaries), and internal and 
external contradictions built into the structures of reality – ie. between structure 
and superstructure and different elements of the superstructure (external) and 
forces and relations of production and social classes (internal and transformative) - 
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 both of which have explanatory significance.
158
 The fact that these are implicit 
rather than explicit does not mean that they are absent. I would say that a 
‘materialist diffraction of dialectic’ is to be found in the work of all the major 
thinkers of classical Marxism.
159
 
Bhaskar is also ill-informed, to offer a second example, in his sweeping 
assertion that the fundamental errors of both socialist politics and Marxian 
philosophy are ultimately explainable (or perhaps deeply embedded) in the 
conceptual weaknesses of their manner of appropriation or critique of Hegelian 
dialectic. For Bhaskar, Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s concept of ‘preservative 
dialectical sublation, which incorporates the cancelled moments of the [historical] 
process within the final totality’, leads ‘to the failure … to come to terms with the 
material … presence of the past’160 in the present. This is said to provide a 
philosophical explanation of the misguided attempt by the Stalinists to build 
‘socialism in one country’, this evidencing the ‘sinking back into a simple 
undifferentiated unity (reflecting the most primitive logic of Hegel’s Being’.161 
Thus the pathologies of ‘state socialism’ can ‘be given Marxian credentials, 
however much Marx would have loathed the outcome’.162  
For Bhaskar also, ‘cognitive triumphalism’, informed by the Hegelian 
notion of the closed totality, is the fundamental error of ‘dialectical materialism’: 
 
Reality is a potentially infinite totality, of which we know something but 
not how much. This is not the least of my differences with Hegel, who, 
although a more subtle exponent of cognitive triumphalism … nevertheless 
is a conduit directly connecting … to Lenin and thence diamat and the 
erstwhile command economies of the omniscient party states.
163
 
 
Yet these assertions (and that is really all they are) are under-theorised and 
remarkably weak. Bhaskar may well be right in his claim that the New Left 
requires better philosophy, but the idea that the politics of the statified ruling class 
of Stalinist Russia was even tenuously influenced by Hegelian dialectic or by the 
dialectical tradition of classical Marxism (for good or for ill) is frankly risible. 
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 First, it is clear that Marx does not simply reject Hegel’s ‘preservative dialectical 
sublation’, though he is rightly suspicious of the idea that all dialectical transitions 
of lower to higher social and intellectual forms must entail the preservation of 
elements of forms that have been transcended. In fact, Marx’s view, central to his 
theory of history and socialist politics, that socialism is feasible only given the 
high level of development of the material productive forces engendered by 
capitalist development, is precisely a materialist restatement of this Hegelian idea. 
Far from representing continuity with Marxian ideas, Stalin’s programme of 
‘socialism in one country’ involved rewriting both Marxism and Leninism.164 
Internationalism was replaced with nationalism to bolster the power of the newly 
emergent bureaucratic elite.  
Thus Lenin and the Bolsheviks were unambiguous from the start that, if 
isolated in backward Russia, the revolution would degenerate and fail, precisely 
because the moment of the past in the present would prove ultimately decisive. 
Their political strategy for achieving socialism in Russia was predicated on the 
imminence of revolutions in the advanced capitalist societies, which their own 
actions would help ignite in the context of war- and recession-ravaged Europe, this 
allowing the massive transfer of material resources from West to East for purposes 
of socialist reconstruction. The failure of this strategy meant the revolution was 
subjected to relentless pressure by a combination of desperately unfavourable 
material circumstances. Chief among these was the devastation wreaked on the 
population and the productive forces by the fascistic counter-revolution and the 
foreign military interventions. This decimated the working class that made the 
revolution and which constituted the mainstay of soviet democracy, forced the 
regime to assume hyper-centralised command of society (‘war communism’) in 
order to defeat the counter-revolutionaries, and thus created the space for a new 
statified ruling class to assume the reigns of political and economic power through 
its control over the organs of party and state.
165
 
Second, Bhaskar’s view that Hegel’s cognitive triumphalism’ has cast its 
baneful shadow over dialectical materialism, is called into doubt by the simple fact 
that there are different forms of ‘diamat’, reductionist and non-reductionist. The 
absolutist, economic-determinist Stalinised versions of it stemmed not from 
philosophical errors, as Bhaskar seems to imply, but from the vested political 
interests of the elites that controlled the bureaucratised western communist parties 
and the former ‘communist’ states of Eastern Europe. Engels’ dialectical 
conception of the ‘interconnectedness of things’, in contrast to fatalist or 
determinist versions, sees totality not as an absolute, but as a necessarily 
provisional or partial picture of nature, because reality is in constant movement 
                                                 
164
 Molyneux 1985, pp. 41–53. 
165
 Callinicos 1991, pp. 15–40; Rees 1991, pp. 29–70. 
 and change, which also functions as a necessary aspiration of scientific 
understanding or endeavour, even if never a fully attainable one.
166
  
This insight of Engels has proven an extremely fertile one in providing 
guidance to certain forms of scientific analysis. For example, it has become central 
to the theoretical work of the so-called ‘left Darwinians’ in the modern biological 
and ecological sciences. Rose et al.,
167
 for instance, show how an account of 
human society is richer and more complete, or aspires to a greater universality or 
more inclusive totality, if it strives to integrate the knowledge derived from a 
broad spectrum of the relevant sciences (social psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, evolutionary biology, etc.), than if it remains solely on the terrain of 
one or other of these sciences. 
It is hard to dissent from Callinicos’s view that Bhaskar is led into this 
unfortunate tendency of ‘reading-off’ complex social, political and economic 
outcomes from the ‘original sin’ of philosophical error as a consequence of the 
inflated status he would attribute to abstract philosophical reasoning of a 
transcendental nature in analysing and explaining the world. In his earlier work, 
Bhaskar attributed to philosophy the more modest role of ‘under-labourer’ and 
‘midwife’ of science.168 Here philosophy, even though it gave guidance to science, 
was nonetheless open to revision and interrogation by the methods of thinking and 
practical resultants of the sciences, to the provisional knowledges these established 
about the world. Perhaps partly as a result of Bhaskar’s ‘mystical turn’ (ie. his 
recent conversion to deism and the hokum of New Age spiritualism) represented 
by his From East to West, this more modest (and sensible) role assigned to 
philosophy has been increasingly undermined. The role and status of 
transcendental philosophical claims has been greatly expanded in Dialectic, 
allowing the ‘logical’ grounding of sociological and political arguments, which 
really need to be established on their own terrain. Philosophy, in its dialectical 
critical realist form, has become for Bhaskar ‘foundational’ to science.  
This explains ‘the proliferation of quick-kill arguments from a priori 
premises to conclusions embodying substantive and controversial generalisations 
about the world that is such a distressing feature of Dialectic’.169 But, as Callinicos 
rightly says, ‘there are grounds for thinking that a more consistent naturalism, 
which stressed more strongly than Bhaskar does the continuity between 
philosophy and the sciences and the former’s dependence on the latter, could 
protect him from the extravagant claims for philosophy into which he is 
sometimes tempted, and provide a more secure basis for the many valid insights 
and fertile ideas this challenging and original philosopher has to offer’.170 This 
would draw Bhaskar’s philosophy much closer to Engels’ dialectical materialism, 
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 which is as much about philosophical generalisation from the methods and 
theories of the sciences as it is about providing methodological and theoretical 
guidance to practical scientific research. 
Now, aside from Bhaskar’s flawed understanding of the relationship 
between Hegel and the classical Marxist tradition, there are major problems with 
his substantive treatment of Marxian social theory. Bhaskar identifies a number of 
defects of Marx’s historical materialism,171 which his own DCR system is said to 
have resolved. None of these are especially original or interesting. The first is that 
Marx treats class divisions as the primary mode of stratification in social systems. 
The second is that Marx endorses a linear ‘stages’ theory of socio-historical 
development. The third is that Marx sometimes tends to postulate ‘endism’ or 
‘teleologism’, presenting communism as the necessary or logical terminus of the 
dialectic of history. The fourth is that Marx tends towards a kind of technological 
functionalism, stressing only the emancipatory role of the development of the 
productive forces, and ignoring the downside of technology under capitalism.  
The fifth is that (apparently) Marx regarded nature anthropocentrically as 
simply the raw material of transformative social labour, and thus as something to 
be controlled or mastered by human beings, rather than as something upon which 
humans are dependent for their physical and mental well-being. The sixth is that 
Marx endorsed an (economic?) evolutionism, under the influence of Darwinian 
materialism. This presumably ties in with Marx’s ‘endism’, technological 
functionalism, and ‘stageism’. The seventh appears to be that Marx is guilty of 
downplaying the multiplicity of oppressions or antagonisms (modes of 
stratification) which have existed in most historical societies (I cannot be certain 
about this interpretation of his meaning given Bhaskar’s opaque terminology). 
This weakness is presumably a function of Marx’s prioritisation of class relations 
in social analysis. 
At a later point in the book, Bhaskar revisits his critique of Marxism, where 
he suggests that Marx’s account of transformative social change was pulled in 
opposite directions, between asserting a tendential determinism of historical 
outcomes by modes of production, and asserting the possibility of historical 
mutations, as determined by a plurality of non-economic processes.
172
 This seems 
a rather more qualified and cautious criticism of Marx and Marxism than the 
earlier ones of economism, endism and stageism. Nonetheless Bhaskar still 
attributes to Marx, on the strength of a single quote, a ‘unilinear view of geo-
history’, from ‘which spread the functionalist and evolutionary … models 
characteristic of Marxism for most of this century’.173 ‘This’ Marx is said to be 
contradicted by the ‘other’ Marx, who denied a unilinear directional logic to 
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 history, and who ridiculed attempts to portray historical materialism as postulating 
just such a unilinear historical pattern. 
I will not dwell long on the defects of this ‘shopping list’ of Marxian errors, 
not least because I have already made the relevant disconfirming arguments both 
in this paper and at greater length elsewhere. Amazingly, Bhaskar’s initial critique 
is compressed into just seven lines of text, and is so heavily jargonised it is 
difficult to be certain my above interpretation is a reasonable approximation of his 
argument. Assuming that it is, Marx deserves better treatment than this, 
particularly from a philosopher of the left. Obviously, it is very disappointing to 
see Bhaskar regurgitating what is to all intents and purposes the standard liberal 
critique of historical materialism, especially since most of this has been decisively 
undermined by a succession of left critics over the past twenty years. Bhaskar 
himself concedes that ‘corresponding to each charge, one can find contrary 
evidence in his [Marx’s] oeuvre’.174 Quite so. But this qualification does not go 
nearly far enough. 
I have pointed out that there is in fact precious little textual evidence in 
Marx’s voluminous writings that support the interpretations (of teleologism, 
economism, stageism, endism, anthropocentrism, etc.) that Bhaskar would foist on 
their author. I have argued that much of this (already sparse) textual evidence is of 
ambiguous meaning or significance. And I have pointed out that the overall 
theoretical logic of Marx’s work (immature and mature) cuts overwhelmingly 
against the orthodox critique. All of this reveals the dangers of taking a handful of 
isolated passages out of context.  
Bhaskar’s charge of teleologism, which he aims at ‘young Marx’, is in any 
case a bit rich, given that he himself now appears committed to a form of 
historical teleology that seems stronger than the one hinted at by Marx even in his 
youthful Manuscripts.
175
 Yet Bhaskar is on to something where he takes Marx to 
task for asserting the primacy of class. Here Marx is indeed guilty as charged. Far 
from being a weakness of historical materialism, though, I have argued that 
Marx’s insistence that class antagonisms and conflicts – as these are over-
determined by modes of production – have explanatory primacy in explaining the 
constitution and dynamics of social systems, is precisely its enduring strength. It 
certainly cannot be dismissed without reasoned argument by simply invoking the 
bogeyman of ‘class/power2 one-dimensionality’.176 Here Bhaskar needs to do 
better.  
I have now said enough about the weaknesses of Bhaskar’s substantive 
critique of Marxism. I now wish to conclude by considering the question of the 
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 adequacy of some of Bhaskar’s core dialectical concepts. Now Bhaskar is 
mistaken to argue, against Hegel, that dialectic is defensible only if the concept of 
‘unity’ is subordinated to the concept of ‘difference’.177 Bhaskar’s argument in 
favour of this position is that Hegel’s stress on unity eventually dissolves 
contradiction in the harmonious realm of the Absolute. On this interpretation, in a 
sense Hegel’s contradictions aren’t real, because they express partial or 
incomplete knowledge or rationality of a world that in essence is harmonious, 
though ignorant of its harmony, not of existential incompatibilities existing in their 
own right. But if Hegel is indeed guilty as charged, this error would seem more 
likely to follow from his teleological idealism than from his failure to explicitly 
prioritise difference over unity in an explanatory or ontological sense. After all, 
subordinating unity to difference could easily destroy totality (qua postmodern 
social theory), just as the reverse strategy dissolves conflict and contradiction (qua 
sociological functionalism). Since the two sides of being, difference and unity, are 
dialectically interpenetrated, it makes no sense to treat either as more or less 
significant than the other. 
There are also problems with Bhaskar’s fundamental treatment of dialectic 
as the ‘absenting of absence’. For one thing, in Bhaskar’s hands, this leads to the 
over-use and over-extension of dialectical causality, so much so it is in danger of 
being trivialised. Dialectic is simply far too elastic, this diminishing its 
explanatory power and theoretical interest, rather like the fate of the concept of 
power in Foucault’s later work. Since virtually every event or action or state of 
affairs involves an absenting in some sense (unconsciousness absents 
consciousness, work absents leisure, drink absents thirst, food absents hunger, 
knowledge absents ignorance, standing up absents sitting down, spring absents 
winter, etc.), it seems that the concept is better reserved for a particular class of 
absences, namely real determinate negations, ie. those concepts that denote 
specific situations or states of absence without corresponding presence or 
positivity (illness as the absence of health, death as the absence of life, chaos as 
the absence of order, slavery as the absence of freedom, etc.). However, despite 
this criticism, Bhaskar’s understanding of the dialectic of history as the absenting 
of constraining ills on freedom still stands. The ‘logic of absence’ is in this sense 
still the pulse of freedom. 
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 This is paralleled by a certain slippage in Bhaskar’s understanding of stratification and 
emergence in comparison to his earlier work. Here, instead of emergent strata being explained 
by those in which they are rooted, and hence determined by a specific pattern of complexity of 
interaction at the lower level, they are spontaneous innovations ‘out of pre-existing material 
from which they could have been neither induced or deduced’. Bhaskar 1993, p. 49. Of course, 
to point out that higher order structures in society and elsewhere are ‘determined’ by underlying 
structures is not to resort to ‘greedy reductionism’. ‘Determination’ should be grasped in terms 
of stratification, rootedness and emergence, meaning that, eg., physical mechanisms explain 
biological mechanisms, or economic mechanisms explain political mechanisms, without 
‘explaining them way’ (they remain efficacious in their own right). 
 Further, Bhaskar’s ontological prioritising of absence over presence seems 
problematic. There are two difficulties here. First, Bhaskar does not demonstrate 
satisfactorily that non-being should be prioritised over being. Bhaskar claims that 
‘if there was a unique beginning to everything it could only be from nothing by an 
act of radical autogenesis’.178 This does not advance his case at all, however, since 
speculative ‘ifs’ and ‘buts’ don’t add up to an argument, and ‘something out of 
nothing’ is obviously a violation of the law of non-contradiction.179 Precisely 
because absence (in our world at least) can only be defined in relation to presence, 
and of course vice versa, and precisely because it is impossible to attribute any 
rational meaning to ‘something out of nothing’, this is insufficient to establish 
Bhaskar’s view that non-being is foundational to being.  
The problem here is that Bhaskar’s generally good arguments in defence of 
the idea that negativity or absence is ontologically real,
180
 and thus his arguments 
against the doctrine of ontological monovalence, are often treated as adequate to 
the job of demonstrating his stronger claim that negativity (determinate non-being) 
is ontologically basic or prior to positivity (determinate being). Bhaskar is 
probably correct to claim that ‘the identification of a positive existent is a human 
act’, thus involving ‘the absenting of a pre-existing state of affairs’, this 
constituting transcendental deduction of the category of absence’.181 He is also on 
to something where he argues that only ‘in a state of eternal all-pervasive monism 
would the category of absence not be necessary for the deduction of coherent 
concepts of space and time’.182 But all of this seems inconclusive on the deeper 
issue of whether either being or non-being (or neither one nor the other) should be 
regarded as ontologically basic.  
Bhaskar asserts that positive presence is but the surface ripple on an ocean 
of negativity. But how can this be ontologically justified? Bhaskar argues that ‘a 
world without voids (absences)’, that is, ‘a … material object world … of 
condensely compacting particles … would be a world in which nothing could 
move or occur, as it presupposes an impossible conjunction of atomicity, rigidity 
and immediacy’.183 This takes him to what he believes is a decisive fourth 
argument in defence of his position. ‘If a totally positive material object world – a 
packed world without absences – is impossible, there is no a priori reason to 
exclude the opposite – namely a total void, literally nothing.184 So absence is 
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 ontologically prior to presence, for Bhaskar, because a material pluriverse without 
voids is logically inconceivable, whereas a pluriverse of determinate non-being or 
negativity is at least possible.  
Here Bhaskar is on to something. But this is still indecisive. For sure, 
negativity or non-being is conceivable without being or positive presence, and not 
vice versa, but this has no bearing on the issue of whether in reality the first is 
prior or foundational to the second or whether the two have co-existed through 
eternity as interdependent realities. To assume as much is precisely to make the 
error of logicising being and non-being, which Bhaskar accuses Hegel of. But, 
since the only reality our science and philosophy can speak meaningfully about is 
our world, in which presence and absence are on a par with one another and 
necessarily interdependent, this seems a good enough reason to treat Bhaskar’s 
transcendental deduction of the ontological primacy of negativity with suspicion. 
But, in fact, it is possible to draw a more radical conclusion against 
Bhaskar, though perhaps not a decisive one. For a tentative argument, this one 
based not on transcendental methods but rather on the knowledge provided by the 
contemporary physical sciences, can be made in support of the thesis that being is 
ontologically basic to non-being. Certainly, despite Bhaskar’s claim that there 
must be empty space between materialities to allow the possibility of matter-in-
motion, and so development, emergence, etc., it has to be admitted that this by no 
means follows, not if we grasp materiality as possessing physical and non-physical 
attributes or dimensions, and the inherent capacity to transform itself from one to 
the other.  
Modern physics does appear to provide some kind of warranty for this view:  
 
Even the notion of the vacuum, empty space, has now been shown to be 
mistaken on closer investigation. Rather the vacuum seems to be a bubbling 
sea in which particles, packets of matter and energy, continually froth in and 
out of existence… Moreover, all the known ‘particles’ and ‘forces’ of 
matter are simply different and transient manifestations of the same 
underlying essence (which most scientists would today call energy)… This 
is not just speculation. This process plays a key role, for example, in the 
spontaneous emission of light by some atoms. The general picture emerging 
from modern physics is that change, continual process, interaction and 
transformation are a fundamental property of matter, and of the space that 
can no longer be seen as separate from it.
185
  
 
This seems to suggest that absolute determinate absence, in the ontological 
sense, is questionable. At the ‘rock bottom’ physical level of our universe, instead 
of reality consisting of being and non-being, it is rather comprised of the continual 
transformation or transmission of the various ‘forces’ and ‘particles’ of material 
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 being into each other.
186
 One virtue of this reversal of Bhaskar’s argument is that it 
overcomes the difficulty of squaring dialectical causality (ie. dialectic as the logic 
of stratification and emergence) with the notion that ‘rock-bottom’ reality is 
simply existential disorder, randomness, potentia, pure dispositionality, 
structurelessness, etc.
187
 Since non-being has no causal powers (these pertaining 
only to relations between things, ie. structures), and since dialectical processes of 
absenting absence (and hence of evolutionary emergence) are energised by virtue 
of structures, it is difficult to see how a world of positive being could have 
emerged from a state of pure negativity or void. In short, the logic of dialectic 
itself does not seem consistent with Bhaskar’s ontological prioritisation of absence 
over presence. 
Another problem with Bhaskar’s ontological prioritising of absence has 
been identified by Callinicos. ‘If, as Bhaskar claims, ‘[n]on-being is a condition of 
possibility of being’, why is there a tendency to eliminate it? Whence the impulse 
to absent absence, if absence is ontologically prior to presence?’.188 As Callinicos 
rightly observes, the only substantial answer Bhaskar gives to this question is 
specific to the human and social world. The ‘absenting of absence’ is conceived 
by Bhaskar as ‘absenting most notably of constraints on desires, wants, needs and 
interests’.189 Thus Bhaskar argues that absenting absence is energised by the ‘inner 
urge that flows universally from the logic of elemental desire (lack, need, want or 
desire). It manifests itself wherever power2 relations hold sway’.190 Yet, ‘[i]n 
general, Bhaskar seems to regard the dialectic as operative in nature as well as in 
society’.191 For Bhaskar ‘there is nothing anthropomorphic about the dialectic 
presented here’.192 This being the case, the problem arises as to how and why the 
dialectical process unfolds outside the human-social world by virtue of the 
absenting of absence. Bhaskar provides no satisfactory answer to this question.  
Instead Bhaskar’s explanation of the pulse of dialectic outside the human 
and social worlds consists simply of asserting the uncontroversial fact that change 
and development precisely is the process of absenting or negating a stratum, 
object, or state of affairs. To negate or absent something is by definition to act 
causally in the world and thus to bring about a transformative change in the world. 
Dialectic is thus the dynamic interplay of causal power and contradiction. But this 
seems to be a mere description of dialectical causality rather than an explanation 
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 of how or why it unfolds at different levels of the cosmos.
193
 The dialectic here has 
no genuinely causal status, because no explanation is given of why there exists 
this drive or imperative to absent absence in unreflective inorganic nature, or how 
this dialectical impulse of absenting absence is translated into mechanisms of 
transformative change at different strata of nature.  
Nor do I think that a satisfactory answer can be given. Certainly, the 
dialectic conceived in this way functions as an understanding of the dialectics of 
consciousness and life. In the former case, conceptual progress is indeed a 
function of the rational drive to overcome ‘gaps’ in understanding or knowledge, 
and this process is ultimately energised by the desire of human beings to maximise 
their freedoms. In the latter case, it is at least conceivable that the essence of 
dialectic consists in its parcelling out of constraints on freedom or autonomy 
(positivity as the converse of negativity). For it is plausible to see organisms as 
engaged in a struggle against their own absenting or to absent those forces or 
negations that restrict or constrain their life-chances.  
Thus the ‘absenting of absenting ills’ appears here as a genuinely causal 
mechanism or logic of explanation. But this kind of explanatory logic or mode of 
causality allows little purchase on the unreflective dialectic of inorganic nature. 
This knows nothing of rationality, desire, freedom, need, and authors no struggle 
against lack. Indeed, as I have tried to show elsewhere,
194
 Engels’ ‘laws of the 
dialectic’, in particular his understanding of emergence and stratification as 
functions of determinate negations specific to particular strata and objects, offers 
far more grip on the dynamics of change in natural systems than this abstract 
universalising formulation of Bhaskar’s. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Rather than summarise the preceding, I will finish with a few substantive 
conclusions on the question of the contemporary significance and status of 
Bhaskar’s Dialectic and the CR system upon which it is based. First, despite its 
problems and errors, Bhaskar’s dialectic is unquestionably the most significant 
statement of dialectical realist philosophy to emerge outside classical Marxism. 
The scope and ambition of Bhaskar’s project is hugely impressive. Not only is 
DCR the genuine enrichment and progressive radicalisation of CR that Bhaskar 
claims for it, it is furthermore the most comprehensive critical review of classical 
dialectical philosophy (even if some of this misses the target). Dialectic is 
significant because it is a powerful challenge to opponents of dialectic both inside 
and outside the CR camp, and an important restatement of the relevance of 
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 Marxian dialectic and legitimate systematic specification of it (for reasons 
discussed in this paper).  
 
The main strengths of Dialectic can be summarised as follows: 
 
1) Stratification and emergence. These dialectically reworked concepts 
allow a precise theoretical specification of the central category of 
Marxian dialectic – unity-in-difference or differentiated totality. Now the 
ghost of reductionism (whether of wholes to their parts or parts to their 
wholes) has been decisively dispelled. 
 
2) The non-preservative sublation of Hegelian dialectic. Though starting 
off from Marx’s critique of Hegel, Bhaskar assembles the most 
systematic and comprehensive review of Hegel’s system. Though much 
of this is unoriginal, and some of the critique of Hegel is perhaps 
misplaced, Bhaskar still impressively synthesises a wide range of critical 
commentaries on Hegelian dialectic with his CR and DCR concepts, this 
supporting a materialist diffraction of dialectic broadly consistent with 
Marx’s dialectic. 
 
3) Negativity and the logic of absence. This is the engine of Bhaskar’s 
dialectic, and the conceptual centrepiece of the book. Although there are 
problems with Bhaskar’s view that all change is a function of absenting 
absence, and with his claim that ‘negativity wins’ (in the sense of 
enjoying ontological priority over positive being), Bhaskar nonetheless 
demonstrates that negativity and absence are as ontologically real as 
positivity and presence. His argument is a brilliant demolition of 
ontological monovalence. 
 
4) Modes of negation and contradiction. A systematic specification of the 
nature of dialectic. Though much of Bhaskar’s argument recalls Hegel’s 
own insights, there is value in Bhaskar’s translation of these into his 
DCR mode. This seems to me to have practical analytical use in social 
theory and research in unravelling the nature, limits and possibilities of 
systemic change. 
 
5) Eudaimonia and socio-historical development. A most welcome 
development of Bhaskar’s critical naturalism. Against the 
overwhelmingly dominant current in contemporary social theory, which 
regards socio-historical processes as simply indeterminate, dialectical 
critical naturalism postulates a tendential directionality or ‘directional 
impulse’ in socio-historical development towards human emancipation. 
Despite Bhaskar’s critique of Marx’s evolutionism, this is undoubtedly a 
 form of evolutionism, and broadly consistent (in this specific 
emancipatory sense) with historical materialism.  
 
Second, despite its considerable merits, Bhaskar’s Dialectic cannot be seen 
as underwriting Marxian dialectic, or as a sublation of Marxian dialectic in the 
sense of providing historical materialism with new dialectical concepts which 
simultaneously preserve yet supersede the old (and which are therefore 
indispensable to it), if indeed this is its intention, which is far from certain. 
Dialectic leans rather too heavily on materialist dialectic (including Marx’s 
critique of Hegel) for this to be a plausible interpretation of its function. Nor, 
indeed, can it legitimately function as an alternative to the dialectical materialism 
pioneered by Engels on the terrain of philosophy proper, since I have argued that 
this form of diamat shares with the DCR ontology at least some of its strengths 
and fewer of its weaknesses.  
This being the case, it seems that the best way forward for dialectical 
philosophy and social theory is attempting a synthesis of the best elements of DCR 
and materialist dialectic: from Bhaskar, the dialectically reworked concepts of 
depth realism (especially stratification and emergence); from Marxism the 
philosophical dialectical framework within which these ontological concepts and 
Bhaskar’s insights into dialectic can be incorporated. Bhaskar thus far has not 
fully accomplished this objective. 
Finally, and I would say inevitably for a work of this scope and ambition, 
Bhaskar’s fledgling DCR system introduced here is not without ambiguities, 
difficulties and (a handful of) more substantial defects. Though many of the 
ambiguities and difficulties will doubtless be resolved when Bhaskar pursues and 
clarifies many of the themes and issues he has only touched on in Dialectic (ie. in 
his forthcoming Dialectical Social Theory), the more substantial problems I have 
identified will require conceptual revision to overcome.  
These include: (1) Bhaskar’s thesis that non-being is basic to being; (2) his 
attempt to grasp dialectic generally (ie. outside the domains of the organic and 
human-social worlds) as the impulse or drive to absent constraints on constraining 
ills (in fact, the application of Bhaskar’s dialectic is specific to society, life and 
consciousness, and extends no further; (3) the abstract utopianism and idealism of 
his moral realism; (4) his substantive critique of Marxian historical materialism 
and aspects of materialist dialectic; and (5) his tendency to locate sub-optimal 
substantive societal and historical outcomes (eg. Stalinism) in the ‘original sin’ of 
philosophical error.  
Excising these weaknesses will not subvert the substance of Bhaskar’s DCR 
philosophy, which is on balance an impressive accomplishment, but will 
strengthen it. Of course, whether Bhaskar is able to build on his ‘materialist 
diffraction of dialectic’ will depend on his ending his recent unfortunate flirtation 
with irrealist dialectics (idealism, godism, spiritualism, etc.). It is to be hoped that 
he does so. So too that he remedies his unfortunate tendency towards academicism 
 and scholasticism, which has marred his recent work, and which has unfortunately 
blunted the critical and emancipatory edge of Dialectic. 
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